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Why Courts Fail to Protect Privacy: 
Race, Age, Bias, and Technology 
Bernard Chao, Catherine Durso, Ian Farrell & Christopher 
Robertson* 
ABSTRACT 
The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable “searches 
and seizures,” but in the digital age of stingray devices and IP 
tracking, what constitutes a search or seizure? The Supreme Court has 
held that the threshold question depends on and reflects the 
“reasonable expectations” of ordinary members of the public 
concerning their own privacy. For example, the police now exploit the 
“third party” doctrine to access data held by email and cell phone 
providers, without securing a warrant, on the Supreme Court’s 
intuition that the public has no expectation of privacy in that 
information. Is that assumption correct? If judges’ intuitions about 
privacy do not reflect actual public expectations, it may undermine the 
legitimacy of the criminal justice system, exacerbate social unrest, and 
produce unjust outcomes. 
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Although prior research has shown that the police 
disproportionately target younger people and minority communities, 
judges tend to be male, white, educated, affluent, and older than the 
general population. Their intuitions may thus be systematically 
different. Even worse, cognitive science suggests that judges may have 
difficulty putting themselves into the shoes of the searched person or 
considering the reasonableness of the police tactics from an ex ante 
perspective, without knowledge about the fruits of the search. 
With 1,200 respondents, we conducted a large-scale survey 
experiment to test whether—and if so, why—contemporary Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence diverges from the societal norms it purports 
to protect and reflect. We identify a range of privacy expectations for 
eighteen different police practices. We use oversampling, reweighting, 
and randomization to demonstrate that there is disparity between 
judicial and public expectations and investigate the particular causes. 
In close cases, these disparities are sufficiently large that the Court 
may be drawing conclusions that conflict with the views of ordinary 
citizens. We conclude by suggesting better ways forward, so that social 
science evidence can replace judicial speculation. 
“[J]udges are apt to confuse their own expectations of privacy with those 
of the hypothetical reasonable person. . . .” 
Justice Samuel Alito1 
“Although constitutional law is riddled with empirical judgments, this 
fact seems to be lost on most constitutional law scholars.” 
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INTRODUCTION 
Constitutional law routinely rests “on some sort of empirical assertion.”3 
Yet all too often those assertions are based not on reliable empirical data, but 
rather on judges’ intuitions and sheer speculations. The Fourth Amendment is a 
prominent example. The Supreme Court’s threshold definition of “searches and 
seizures,” to which the Fourth Amendment applies, turns on the “reasonable 
expectations” of ordinary members of the public. The Supreme Court has, 
however, developed Fourth Amendment doctrine without drawing on data about 
 
 3. See id. at 1009. 
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the actual beliefs of those people. The Court implicitly instructs the federal and 
state judiciaries—which together tend to be male, white, educated, affluent, 
older, and less frequently searched—to speculate about how other Americans 
actually experience police practices. The result is that contemporary Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence diverges substantially from the societal norms it 
purports to protect and reflect. Such a divergence may undermine the legitimacy 
of the judiciary and exacerbate social unrest.4 
This Article fills an important part of the empirical gap in Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence. We conducted a robust empirical study of the views 
of members of the public on “reasonable expectations of privacy” to inform 
judicial decisions about whether police conduct constitutes a search.5 
Concomitantly, whether police conduct constitutes a seizure turns upon 
reasonable expectations of privacy, liberty, and autonomy.6 Therefore, “if one 
takes the Justices at their word, a sense of how (innocent) U.S. citizens gauge the 
impact of police investigative techniques on their privacy and autonomy is highly 
relevant to current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.”7 
We recruited a diverse sample of 1,200 individuals to determine their views 
on various police investigative practices. We presented the respondents with a 
set of scenarios and asked them whether the police actions violated their 
reasonable expectations of privacy. These scenarios reflect police tactics that 
have already been the subject of Supreme Court review as well as emerging 
tactics that rely upon new technologies. We suspected that results from the 
former scenarios would show that the Supreme Court’s doctrine does not 
correspond to the views of ordinary members of the public, while results for the 
latter could help courts address emerging police tactics. 
Our data confirm our suspicions. Both the Supreme Court and lower courts 
substantially underestimate the extent to which ordinary individuals perceive 
police practices to infringe upon their expectations of privacy and autonomy. 
This is especially the case in the scenarios involving the application of the “third 
party” doctrine to police access to new technology, such as smartphones and the 
internet.8 Scenarios that, under the third party doctrine, would not constitute a 
 
 4. See Jeffrey Fagan & Tracey L. Meares, Punishment, Deterrence and Social Control: The 
Paradox of Punishment in Minority Communities, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 173 (2008); Tom R. Tyler & 
Jonathan Jackson, Popular Legitimacy and the Exercise of Legal Authority: Motivating Compliance, 
Cooperation and Engagement, 20 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 78 (2014) (discussing the role that 
institutional legitimacy plays in achieving public compliance with the law). 
 5. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (holding that the warrantless use of a listening 
device was an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment). 
 6. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 544 (1980) (describing a seizure as an “intrusion 
upon that person’s liberty or privacy”). 
 7. See also Christopher Slobogin & Joseph E. Schumacher, Reasonable Expectations of 
Privacy and Autonomy in Fourth Amendment Cases: An Empirical Look at “Understandings 
Recognized and Permitted by Society,” 42 DUKE L.J. 727, 732 (1993). 
 8. The third party doctrine states that there is “no legitimate ‘expectation of privacy’” in 
“information revealed to a third party and conveyed by him to Government authorities.” United States 
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search or seizure were treated by our survey respondents as more intrusive than 
those the Court considers the most intrusive and requiring the most stringent 
justification.9 We therefore argue that when the Supreme Court is called to rule 
upon these new investigative techniques, the Court should refuse to apply the 
third party doctrine. Indeed, the Supreme Court has the opportunity do just that 
in Carpenter v. United States, which is currently pending before the Court.10 
Other cases also involving technology searches similar to the scenarios we tested 
are sure to follow quickly on Carpenter’s heels.11 
Importantly, our study also examined why judicial doctrine diverges from 
societal views of privacy and autonomy. We applied an innovative experimental 
design that allowed us to assess whether first person and outcome biases affect 
people’s views of whether police conduct violates their reasonable expectations 
of privacy and autonomy. We tested for these biases by manipulating the 
perspective of the survey respondent (whether the respondent was the searched 
person or an observer) and whether the participants were told that the search 
revealed incriminating evidence. We also enriched our sample to explore the 
potential for racialized perceptions of government legitimacy in this sensitive 
law enforcement domain, a nuance that may not be fully captured by the 
speculations of a less-diverse judiciary. 
We have five primary findings relevant to law and policy. First and most 
importantly, in general, the U.S. public has greater concerns for privacy than are 
reflected in current judicial doctrine. Second, current judicial doctrine includes 
several relative judgments—e.g., giving no protection to emails held by an 
internet provider, but absolute protection to a bedroom—that do not reflect actual 
expectations of privacy in the United States. Third, the ubiquitous practice of 
judgment in hindsight (i.e., with knowledge that a search has found evidence of 
crime) strongly decreases the likelihood that people will find violations of 
reasonable expectations or privacy. Fourth, the pervasive practice of developing 
Fourth Amendment doctrine through criminal defendants’ suppression motions 
(in the third person) also decreases the likelihood of finding a violation. Fifth, 
whites and older persons (beyond age 41)—such as those who dominate the U.S. 
state and federal judiciary—are less likely to find that police investigative 
practices invade privacy. 
 
v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442–43 (1976); see also Erin Murphy, The Case Against the Case for Third-
Party Doctrine: A Response to Epstein and Kerr, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1239 (2009) (discussing 
various arguments both for and against the third party doctrine). 
 9. See infra Part V(B) for a comparison of our results to the Supreme Court’s holdings. 
 10. United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880 (6th Cir. 2016), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 2211 
(June 5, 2017) (No. 16-402). The question as presented by the petitioner is “[w]hether the warrantless 
seizure and search of historical cell phone records revealing the location and movements of a cell phone 
user over the course of 127 days is permitted by the Fourth Amendment.” Petition for Writ of Certiorari 
at i, Carpenter v. United States, No. 16-402 (U.S. argued Nov. 29, 2017). 
 11. See, e.g., United States v. Mohamud, 843 F.3d 420 (9th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, __ S. Ct. 
___ (Jan. 8, 2018) (No. 17-5126), 2018 WL 311442 (Mem) (challenging the constitutionality of using 
information gathered pursuant to the FISA Amendments Act against U.S. citizens). 
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Our Article proceeds as follows. Part II describes the legal background of 
reasonable expectations of privacy in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Part III 
argues that the Supreme Court’s reasonable expectations of privacy analysis 
purportedly adopts the first person perspective of an innocent suspect, reflective 
of ordinary members of the public. This Part then reviews prior empirical studies 
that suggest problems with the implementation of this doctrine. Part IV describes 
the methodology of our study, Part V reports our findings, and Part VI describes 
the study’s limitations and our recommendations. 
I. 
LEGAL BACKGROUND 
A. Reasonableness Under the Fourth Amendment 
From the outset, it is crucial to distinguish between the separate roles that 
different conceptions of “reasonableness” play in Fourth Amendment doctrine. 
One role comes from the text of the constitutional provision. The Fourth 
Amendment provided in part that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
shall not be violated.”12 But what government conduct constitutes a “search” or 
“seizure”? Only government conduct that is determined to be a search or seizure 
must not be “unreasonable.” 
Second, and more fundamentally, the Supreme Court has also defined 
“searches and seizures”—the threshold question of whether the Fourth 
Amendment applies—by reference to reasonableness. Government conduct 
constitutes a search when it violates “reasonable expectations of privacy”13 and 
constitutes a seizure when it intrudes upon reasonable expectations of 
autonomy.14 
Our study addresses this latter threshold conception of reasonableness 
underpinning the definition of searches and seizures. As we argue in more detail 
below, the Supreme Court has repeatedly—and explicitly—asserted that 
“reasonableness” in this context is determined by the beliefs of the typical 
innocent member of society who is subjected to the potential search or seizure.15 
The beliefs of such members of society are therefore directly relevant to the 
legitimacy of the Supreme Court’s decisions on whether the Fourth Amendment 
applies to various forms of police investigation, making this a particularly ripe 
issue for empirical study. 
 
 12. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 13. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 407 (2012) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 
U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)) (“[A] violation occurs when government officers violate 
a person’s ‘reasonable expectation of privacy.’”). 
 14. See, e.g., Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 7, at 732 (“The Court’s seizure 
cases[‘] . . . repeated use of the ‘reasonable person’ rubric suggests a similar reliance on what the average 
citizen would feel with respect to restraints on freedom of action.”). 
 15. See infra Part III(A). 
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B. The Definition of Searches and Seizures 
The Supreme Court’s interpretation of searches and seizures expanded in 
the twentieth century. In the early case of Olmstead v. United States, the Supreme 
Court defined government searches solely by reference to violations of property 
interests, such that wiretapping telephone lines did not constitute a search since 
the wiretaps “were made without trespass upon any property of the 
defendants.”16 However, in the seminal case Katz v. United States, the Court 
shifted the focus of its Fourth Amendment analysis from property to privacy. 
Writing for the Court, Justice Stewart asserted that this was because “the Fourth 
Amendment protects people, not places.”17 Therefore, “what a person knowingly 
exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth 
Amendment protection. But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area 
accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.”18 
Justice Harlan’s concurrence provided an influential framework. Justice 
Harlan described “a twofold requirement, first that a person have exhibited an 
actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be 
one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”19 
The concept of reasonable expectations of privacy has been the foundation 
of Fourth Amendment analysis in the four decades since Katz was decided.20 
While the Court recently resurrected the property conception of a search in 
United States v. Jones, it did so in a manner that supplemented rather than 
supplanted the privacy conception.21 That is, Jones held that Katz had extended, 
rather than repudiated, the Fourth Amendment protections afforded under the 
property rubric. Post-Katz, a search occurred when government agents intruded 
upon either property interests or reasonable expectations of privacy.22 
In Jones, government agents installed a GPS tracking device on the 
undercarriage of a vehicle and tracked the vehicle’s movements for twenty-eight 
days.23 The Court held that the installation of the GPS device on the vehicle was 
a search because “[t]he Government physically occupied private property for the 
 
 16. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 457 (1928). 
 17. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).  
 18. Id. at 351 (internal citations omitted). 
 19. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 20. See, e.g., California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988) (no privacy in trash left on curb for 
collection); Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984) (no privacy in private property outside the 
curtilage of a home); United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984) (no privacy in contents of a box 
previously opened by a private party); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976) (no privacy in bank 
records); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971) (no privacy in information told to an informant). 
 21. 565 U.S. 400 (2012). 
 22. Id. at 406 (“[F]or most of our history the Fourth Amendment was understood to embody a 
particular concern for government trespass upon the areas (‘persons, houses, papers, and effects’) it 
enumerates. . . . ’[W]e [do not] believe that Katz, by holding that the Fourth Amendment protects persons 
and their private conversations, was intended to withdraw any of the protection which the Amendment 
extends to the home . . . .’”) (alterations in original). 
 23. Id. at 403. 
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purpose of obtaining information.”24 By basing its conclusion on property 
intrusion, the Court sidestepped the crucial but complicated question of whether 
using a GPS device to track the location of a vehicle on public streets for such 
an extended time period was a violation of reasonable expectations of privacy.25 
Nevertheless, the concept of a reasonable expectation of privacy remains 
the touchstone of Fourth Amendment analysis in the wake of Jones. The 
reasonable expectations of privacy analysis will be especially important when 
courts address techniques for obtaining information using new technologies, as 
these will rarely involve physical intrusions into constitutionally protected areas. 
The Court’s definition of a seizure employs a parallel conception of 
reasonableness. United States v. Mendenhall26 established that “a person has 
been ‘seized’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment only if, in view of 
all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would 
have believed that he was not free to leave.”27 The Mendenhall Court looked to 
whether the citizen who is questioned “remains free to disregard the questions 
and walk away,” and, if he or she is able to do so, then “there has been no 
intrusion upon that person’s liberty or privacy.”28 Numerous cases have adopted 
this reasonableness test for whether police conduct constitutes a seizure.29 As 
 
 24. Id. at 404. 
 25. The question the Court avoided answering is precisely one of the scenarios we tested in our 
empirical study. It is also important to note that two of the concurring opinions did address the question 
of whether GPS tracking of a vehicle for twenty-eight days violated reasonable expectations of privacy, 
in important but different ways. Justice Alito applied what is described in the literature as “mosaic 
theory” to argue that surveillance for such an extended use of time constitutes a Fourth Amendment 
search. Id. at 431.  See, e.g., Monu Bedi, Social Networks, Government Surveillance, and the Fourth 
Amendment Mosaic Theory, 94 B.U. L. REV. 1809 (2014); David Gray & Danielle Keats Citron, A 
Shattered Looking Glass: The Pitfalls and Potential of the Mosaic Theory of Fourth Amendment 
Privacy, 14 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 381 (2013); Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 
111 MICH. L. REV. 311, 313 (2012); Matthew B. Kugler & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Actual Expectations 
of Privacy, Fourth Amendment Doctrine, and the Mosaic Theory, 6 SUP. CT. REV. 205 (2015); Christine 
S. Scott-Hayward, Henry F. Fradella & Ryan G. Fischer, Does Privacy Require Secrecy? Societal 
Expectations of Privacy in the Digital Age, 43 AM. J. CRIM. L. 19 (2015). In her concurring opinion, 
Justice Sotomayor agreed with Justice Alito that longer-term GPS monitoring constitutes a Fourth 
Amendment search. Jones, 565 U.S. at 955. But Justice Sotomayor also called into question the 
constitutionality of “even short-term monitoring,” id. at 415, and proposed that “[m]ore fundamentally, 
it may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy 
in information voluntarily disclosed to third parties,” id. at 417. We address this suggestion in greater 
detail Part I.C below. 
 26. 446 U.S. 544 (1980). 
 27. Id. at 554. 
 28. Id. at 554, 546. 
 29. See, e.g., Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 255 (2007) (expressly applying Mendenhall); 
United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 195 (2002) (applying a “reasonable person” standard to 
determine whether a seizure occurred); Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 424 (1991) (same); California 
v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 628 (1991) (“Mendenhall establishes that the test for existence of a “show 
of authority” is an objective one . . . .”); Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 572 (1988) (“[A]ny 
assessment as to whether police conduct amounts to a seizure . . . must take into account ‘all of the 
circumstances surrounding the incident . . . .’”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Florida v. Royer, 460 
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other scholars have pointed out, “[w]hile [the seizure cases] do not rely on 
community values as explicitly as the search cases do, their repeated use of the 
‘reasonable person’ rubric suggests a similar reliance on what the average citizen 
would feel with respect to restraints on freedom of action.”30 Similarly, the 
seizure cases’ repeated description of seizures as intrusions on privacy 
demonstrates that the Court considers (or purports to consider) societal beliefs 
about privacy in both the search and seizure contexts.31 
C. The Third Party Doctrine 
The Supreme Court has developed a number of doctrinal rules that 
purportedly derive from reasonable expectations of privacy. One of these rules 
is the third party doctrine, which states that an individual has no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in information that has been voluntarily disclosed to any 
third party. 
In United States v. Miller,32 for example, the Court held that individuals do 
not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in checks, deposit slips, and other 
documents provided to their bank. These documents contained “only information 
voluntarily conveyed to the banks and exposed to their employees in the ordinary 
course of business.”33 The Miller Court based this rule on its understanding of 
when it is reasonable or legitimate for a person to expect information to remain 
private. The Court declared that “[t]he depositor takes the risk, in revealing his 
affairs to another, that the information will be conveyed by that person to the 
 
U.S. 491, 503 n.9 (1983) (internal citation omitted) (“Our decision here is consistent with the Court’s 
judgment in United States v. Mendenhall.”). 
 30. Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 7, at 732. 
 31. See, e.g., City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 48, 52 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., 
dissenting) (describing roadblock seizures of automobiles as involving “only minimal intrusion on the 
privacy of their occupants” and stating “[i]t is the objective effect of the State’s actions on the privacy 
of the individual that animates the Fourth Amendment”); Michigan Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 
U.S. 444, 448–49 (1990) (quoting Sitz v. Department of State Police, 170 Mich. App. 433, 439 (Mich. 
Ct. App. 1988)) (stating that the test for whether a sobriety checkpoint was a valid seizure required 
balancing the state’s interests against “the level of intrusion on an individual’s privacy caused by the 
checkpoints”); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 514–15 (1983) (explaining that determining whether “a 
seizure less intrusive than a formal arrest” complies with the Fourth Amendment “requires balancing 
the amount of intrusion upon individual privacy against the special law enforcement interests”); 
Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 697–98 (1981) (quoting Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 
209 (1979)) (explaining that “the intrusion on the citizen’s privacy” in many special needs seizures “‘was 
so much less severe’ than that involved in a traditional arrest”); Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554 (describing 
a seizure as an “intrusion upon that person’s liberty or privacy”); Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979) 
(stating that a “central concern [of the Court’s seizure cases] has been to assure that an individual’s 
reasonable expectation of privacy is not subject to arbitrary invasions”); Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 213 
(referring to “[t]he central importance of the probable-cause requirement [for arrest] to the protection of 
a citizen’s privacy”); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 34 (1968) (describing a temporary seizure of Terry as 
“interrupt[ing] Terry’s freedom of movement and invad[ing] his privacy”). 
 32. 425 U.S. 435 (1976) (holding that individuals do not possess a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in information given to a bank). 
 33. Id. at 442. 
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Government.”34 This is true “even if the information is revealed on the 
assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose and the confidence 
placed in the third party will not be betrayed.”35 
The third party doctrine has suffered substantial academic and judicial 
criticisms, especially in light of the profound extent to which we “voluntarily” 
convey information to third parties in the digital age. For example, in United 
States v. Jones,36 Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence called for a wholesale 
reconsideration of “the premise that an individual has no reasonable expectation 
of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third parties.”37 
This approach is ill suited to the digital age, in which people reveal a 
great deal of information about themselves to third parties in the course 
of carrying out mundane tasks. People disclose the phone numbers that 
they dial or text to their cellular providers; the URLs that they visit and 
the e-mail addresses with which they correspond to their Internet service 
providers; and the books, groceries, and medications they purchase to 
online retailers . . . I for one doubt that people would accept without 
complaint the warrantless disclosure to the Government of a list of every 
Web site they visited in the last week, or month, or year.38 
Our empirical study gathers data on precisely the questions about which 
Justice Sotomayor postulated: whether people would consider it reasonable to 
expect privacy in information provided to internet service providers, cell phone 
companies, website operators, and so on. 
Many of the questions about whether there is a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the context of these new technologies remain unresolved by the 
Supreme Court.39 The lower courts have also split on whether the collection of 
historical cell site data, which police can use to approximate a person’s 
movements over periods of time, violates reasonable expectations of privacy.40 
Arguably, whether individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy with 
respect to such technologies is the most important contemporary question in 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.41 The results of our study will therefore 
provide a resource for courts and suggest how the Supreme Court should resolve 
 
 34. Id. at 443. 
 35. Id. 
 36. 565 U.S. 400 (2012). 
 37. Id. at 417. 
 38. Id. at 417–18. 
 39. Id. at 413 (expressly declining to decide whether GPS tracking violated a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in one’s movement on public roads). 
 40. Compare United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421 (4th Cir. 2016) (holding that obtaining cell 
site location information is a search requiring probable cause and a warrant), with United States v. Davis, 
785 F.3d 498 (11th Cir. 2015) and United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880 (6th Cir. 2016) (holding 
that obtaining cell site location information is not a search requiring probable cause and a warrant). 
 41. See, e.g., Elizabeth E. Joh, The New Surveillance Discretion, Automated Suspicion, Big 
Data, and Policing, 10 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 15, 18 (2016) (“[C]urrent unresolved issues of police 
technology have focused on whether a particular use is a Fourth Amendment search requiring a warrant 
and probable cause.”). 
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these issues when, inevitably, it is called upon to do so. In contrast, earlier studies 
tested community members’ opinions on scenarios on which the Supreme Court 
had already ruled.42 Our study is therefore uniquely valuable as a prospective 
guide for the Supreme Court when it wrestles with these issues in the near future. 
D. The Case for Reasonableness as Ordinary Beliefs 
To evaluate a given police practice—whether in the third party context or 
more generally—we join a longstanding and growing chorus of scholars who 
call for empirical study of actual contemporary social norms and understandings. 
A quarter-century ago, Slobogin and Schumacher made a ground-breaking study 
of public attitudes to government searches.43 They pointed primarily to Rakas v. 
Illinois44 as support for the proposition that empirical study could be helpful.45 
In Rakas, the Court asserted that “[l]egitimation of expectations of privacy by 
law must have a source outside of the Fourth Amendment, either by reference to 
concepts of real or personal property law or to understandings that are 
recognized and permitted by society.”46 This language, together with the 
language in which Justice Harlan stated the second prong of the “search” test in 
Katz, suggests that it is society’s beliefs and expectations that determine the 
scope of privacy protected by the Fourth Amendment. 
This conception of reasonable expectations of privacy is supported by a 
slew of other Supreme Court decisions. For example, the Court held in Kyllo v. 
United States that “obtaining by sense-enhancing technology any information 
regarding the home’s interior that could not otherwise have been obtained 
without physical ‘intrusion into a constitutionally protected area’ . . . constitutes 
a search—at least where (as here) the technology in question is not in general 
public use.”47 The Court’s caveat—that government use of technology is not a 
Fourth Amendment search if the technology is in general public use—only 
makes sense if the definition of a search is meant to encapsulate actual social 
beliefs and expectations, shaped by social practices outside the context of police 
investigations. 
The Court took a similar approach in cases addressing whether aerial 
surveillance of the backyard of a person’s house constitutes a search. In 
California v. Ciraolo,48 the Court referred to societal expectations to justify its 
holding that police inspection from a fixed-wing aircraft in navigable airspace 
did not violate reasonable expectations of privacy.49 The Court reasoned that it 
 
 42. See infra Part II. 
 43. Slobogin & Schumacher supra note 7, at 731 (describing “the Court’s willingness to rely on 
societal understandings in defining ‘reasonable expectations of privacy’”). 
 44. 439 U.S. 128 (1978). 
 45. Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 7, at 731. 
 46. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 n.12 (1978) (emphasis added). 
 47. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 28 (2001). 
 48. 476 U.S. 207 (1986). 
 49. Id. at 214. 
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was not reasonable to expect privacy in an area that anyone could view by legally 
flying over it.50 Given that “[a]ny member of the public flying in this airspace 
who glanced down could have seen everything that these officers observed,”51 
the Court “readily conclude[d] that respondent’s expectation that his garden was 
protected from such observation is unreasonable and is not an expectation that 
society is prepared to honor.”52 The Court emphasized that the Katz test 
incorporates the actual beliefs and expectations of members of society by 
asserting that “Justice Harlan made it crystal clear that he was resting on the 
reality that one who enters a telephone booth is entitled to assume that his 
conversation is not being intercepted.”53 The Court found no reasonable 
expectation of privacy “in an age where private and commercial flight in the 
public airways is routine.”54 
Three years later in Florida v. Riley,55 the Court applied the same approach 
to helicopter surveillance from the lower altitude of four hundred feet. The Court 
asserted that “‘private and commercial flight [by helicopter] in the public airways 
is routine’ in this country” and pointed out that “helicopters are not bound by the 
lower limits of the navigable airspace allowed to other aircraft.”56 Therefore, 
“[a]ny member of the public could legally have been flying over Riley’s property 
in a helicopter at the altitude of 400 feet and could have observed Riley’s 
greenhouse. The police officer did no more.”57 
The Supreme Court has also purported to rely on actual social norms and 
understanding when addressing two different aspects of what constitutes a search 
of a person’s house. The first aspect involves situations in which a person other 
than the suspect gives the government investigator permission to enter the 
premises. The second aspect relates to determining whether entry onto a person’s 
curtilage constitutes a trespass and is therefore a search. 
The first aspect is evident in Georgia v. Randolph, where the Court 
surveyed its prior decisions on consent to enter and concluded that: 
The constant element in assessing Fourth Amendment reasonableness 
in the consent cases, then, is the great significance given to widely 
 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 213–14. 
 52. Id. at 214. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 215. 
 55. 488 U.S. 445 (1989). 
 56. Id. at 450–51. 
 57. Id. at 451. We do not offer these examples to endorse the Court’s conclusions about what 
societal expectations actually are—such as the Court’s bare assertion that “any member of the public” 
could have been flying a helicopter over the defendant’s backyard, and therefore it is unreasonable to 
expect privacy in one’s backyard, even when the backyard is shielded from prying eyes at ground level 
or from nearby structures. Id. Indeed, the whole point of our empirical study is to assess quantitatively 
the accuracy of Court’s assumptions and intuitions about social realities. The point of these examples is 
to show that the Court is clearly purporting to draw on the “reality” of social expectations in determining 
what counts as reasonable. 
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shared social expectations, which are naturally enough influenced by 
the law of property, but not controlled by its rules.58 
The Court continued: 
[Our prior decisions] not only hold[] that a solitary co-inhabitant may 
sometimes consent to a search of shared premises, but stands for the 
proposition that the reasonableness of such a search is in significant part 
a function of commonly held understanding about the authority that co-
inhabitants may exercise in ways that affect each other’s interests.59 
In Randolph, the Court applied this approach to a situation in which the 
suspect has expressly refused permission to enter, but a co-occupant has given 
permission. Entry in this situation constitutes a search, because: 
[A] caller standing at the door of shared premises would have no 
confidence that one occupant’s invitation was a sufficiently good reason 
to enter when a fellow tenant stood there saying, “stay out.” Without 
some very good reason, no sensible person would go inside under those 
conditions. . . . Unless the people living together fall within some 
recognized hierarchy, like a household of parent and child or barracks 
housing military personnel of different grades, there is no societal 
understanding of superior and inferior.”60 
Recently, the Court relied on social norms and widely held understandings 
in a second way, namely to determine when physical entry onto the curtilage was 
a Fourth Amendment search. In Florida v. Jardines,61 a police officer took a 
drug-sniffing dog onto the defendant’s front porch, where it explored back and 
forth and sniffed under the front door. The Supreme Court noted that while the 
porch was part of the curtilage and therefore constitutionally protected, “[a] 
license [to enter] may be implied from the habits of the country.”62 What is 
reasonable for a police officer, the Court held, turns on the commonly held 
understanding of members of society: 
Complying with the terms of that traditional invitation does not require 
fine-grained legal knowledge; it is generally managed without incident 
by the Nation’s Girl Scouts and trick-or-treaters. Thus, a police officer 
not armed with a warrant may approach a home and knock, precisely 
because that is “no more than any private citizen might do.”63 
But this license, the Court decided, does not extend to “introducing a 
trained police dog to explore the area around the home in hopes of discovering 
incriminating evidence. . . . There is no customary invitation to do that. An 
 
 58. 547 U.S. 103, 111 (2006) (emphasis added). 
 59. Id. (emphasis added). 
 60. Id. at 113–14 (emphasis added). 
 61. 569 U.S. 1 (2013). 
 62. Id. at 8. 
 63. Id. (quoting Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 469 (2011)). 
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invitation to engage in canine forensic investigation assuredly does not inhere in 
the very act of hanging a knocker.”64 
It is quite instructive for the purposes of our study to note the points of 
agreement and disagreement between the majority and dissent in Jardines. Both 
Justice Scalia’s majority opinion and Justice Alito’s dissent accepted the 
importance of widely shared community norms; however, they disagreed about 
the content of these norms. Justice Scalia wrote: 
With this much, the dissent seems to agree—it would inquire into the 
appearance of things, what is typical for a visitor, what might cause 
alarm to a resident of the premises, what is expected of ordinary visitors, 
and what would be expected from a reasonably respectful citizen. These 
are good questions. But their answers are incompatible with the 
dissent’s outcome, which is presumably why the dissent does not even 
try to argue that it would be customary, usual, reasonable, respectful, 
ordinary, typical, nonalarming, etc., for a stranger to explore the 
curtilage of the home with trained drug dogs.65 
Of course, the majority opinion likewise offered little support for its 
contrary conclusion. Both justices relied on their intuitions and assumptions 
about what is customary or usual, and about what a reasonable, respectful, typical 
person would consider appropriate behavior when approaching a home. Neither 
Justice Scalia nor Justice Alito made any attempt to refer to some external, 
objective basis for their assertions about what is reasonable; both placed blind 
reliance on the notion that they were accurate barometers of the public at large 
and that their gut instincts were commensurate with those of the general 
population. It is precisely this void that survey data like ours can fill. 
These Supreme Court opinions support the proposition that empirical 
evidence of whether “contemporary, ordinary Americans expect privacy in a 
particular context”66 is relevant to whether government investigators have 
conducted a search.67 In an excellent recent article, Matthew Kugler and Lior 
Strahilevitz described this approach as the most natural reading of the Katz 
reasonable expectations of privacy test: “The most obvious approach would 
 
 64. Id. at 9. 
 65. Id. at 8 n.2. (emphasis added) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 
 66. Kugler & Strahilevitz, supra note 25, at 220. 
 67. For an excellent extended discussion of the role of community expectations in deciding 
whether the government is conducting a search, see BARRY FRIEDMAN, UNWARRANTED: POLICING 
WITHOUT PERMISSION, at ch. 9 (2017). Friedman casts the Katz test specifically in terms of social 
convention or social norms. He argues that “Katz can be read as making social convention determinative 
of when we have a reasonable expectation of privacy. In other words, one interpretation of the Katz 
decision is that whether the government is conducting a ‘search’ . . . properly rests on societal norms 
about when we all ought to be able to expect to have our privacy respected.” Id. at 225. While we tested 
individual beliefs rather than social convention, the former presumably inform the latter—and vice 
versa. As Friedman notes, “[t]echnology is invariably going to shift the way we interact with one 
another, and what our expectations of appropriate social behavior are. The law must be concerned with 
how people understand their privacy in the world in which we actually live. And it is to those 
expectations that law enforcement must adhere.” Id. at 226. 
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be . . . to ask a representative sample of Americans such questions directly.”68 
But there is in fact a serious dispute among both jurists and scholars as to whether 
it is appropriate to consult survey data in determining the content of people’s 
reasonable expectations of privacy. The most prominent contrary voice in the 
academy is that of Orin Kerr, who has argued that courts often resolve Katz 
questions without purporting to reflect what ordinary Americans believe or 
expect in particular contexts.69 
Kerr argued that the Supreme Court has not “settle[d] on a single test for 
what makes an expectation of privacy ‘reasonable.’”70 Indeed, “Supreme Court 
opinions cannot even agree on what kind of test it is. Is it descriptive? Is it 
normative? Just what does it measure? The cases are all over the map, and the 
Justices have declined to resolve the confusion.”71 Kerr pointed out that to most 
scholars, the failure to elucidate a general test “is widely considered an 
embarrassment.”72 To Kerr, however, the lack of a grand unified theory is a 
feature, not a bug; it is a strength of Fourth Amendment doctrine rather than a 
weakness. “The Supreme Court,” Kerr argued, “has not and cannot adopt a single 
test for when an expectation is ‘reasonable’ because no one test effectively and 
consistently distinguishes the more troublesome police practices that require 
Fourth Amendment scrutiny from the less troublesome practices that do not.”73 
This is because “the facts of police investigations prove too diverse; no one 
measurement accurately draws the line in all cases.”74 
Kerr argued that, from a descriptive standpoint, “[a]lthough the courts 
speak of a single ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ test, the one label masks 
several distinct but coexisting approaches.”75 Kerr described these coexisting 
approaches as “four models” of Fourth Amendment protection, and contends that 
only one model (what he refers to as the probabilistic model) involves the actual 
expectations of privacy of ordinary citizens.76 Kerr consequently criticized the 
use of survey data in the Fourth Amendment context.77 Slobogin has, however, 
 
 68. Kugler & Strahilevitz, supra note 25, at 228. 
 69. See Orin S. Kerr, Four Models of Fourth Amendment Protection, 60 STAN. L. REV. 503, 
504 (2007) (asserting that the Supreme Court has not established a standard for “what makes an 
expectation of privacy constitutionally ‘reasonable’”). 
 70. Id. at 505. 
 71. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 72. Id. Kerr noted that among scholars, “[t]he Court’s handiwork has been condemned as 
‘distressingly unmanageable,’ ‘unstable,’ and ‘a series of inconsistent and bizarre results that [the Court] 
has left entirely undefended.’” Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 73. Id. at 506. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 508. 
 77. See Orin S. Kerr, Do We Need a New Fourth Amendment?, 107 MICH. L. REV. 951 (2009). 
Kugler and Strahilevitz neatly summarized these concerns as “whether courts have the capacity to assess 
popular attitudes, whether popular attitudes will fluctuate wildly from day to day, why the content of 
constitutional provisions should hinge on those attitudes as opposed to doctrines grounded in prior 
constitutional and property-related precedents, and whether popular attitudes about complicated legal 
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responded that, upon deeper inspection, each of Kerr’s four models collapses 
into an assessment of intrusiveness78—precisely the question Slobogin explored 
in his survey of public attitudes and precisely the question we explore in the 
present study. 
Kugler and Strahilevitz have provided several additional arguments. First, 
they pointed out that Kerr’s four models predate Jones and argued that Jones 
itself seems to reject, at least provisionally and implicitly, some of Kerr’s 
arguments.79 More fundamentally, Kugler and Strahilevitz have rejected the 
desirability of the Court having different models from which to pick and choose, 
“because this approach creates an undue risk of doctrinal incoherence and 
unpredictability.”80 Kugler and Strahilevitz argued, moreover, that it is 
“normatively desirable” to base a unitary test for reasonable expectations of 
privacy on empirical data. They argued that: 
The Fourth Amendment is designed to safeguard individuals against 
governmental overreach. When there is a sharp divide between what the 
courts describe as the Fourth Amendment’s scope and what the people 
actually expect the Fourth Amendment’s scope to be, various problems 
arise. Law-abiding people may take excessive precautions to protect 
their information, keeping it not only from the state’s agents but also 
from third parties who could put the information to productive uses. Or 
citizens might make inordinate investments in learning the contours of 
Fourth Amendment law, time and money that could be better spent 
elsewhere. Also, mistaken expectations limit the effectiveness of the 
democratic process as a check on law enforcement surveillance; the 
public may not move legislatively to protect privacy if they mistakenly 
believe it is already protected constitutionally. Disconnects between 
actual law and perceived law may also provide police officers and 
prosecutors with undue leverage over citizens.81 
 
and technological issues are meaningful.” Kugler & Strahilevitz, supra note 25, at 234. In a more recent 
study, Kugler & Strahilevitz have shown that attitudes on privacy remain relatively stable in response to 
a new Supreme Court decision. See Matthew B. Kugler & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Myth of Fourth 
Amendment Circularity, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 1747 (2018). Moreover, in Section V.B, our own study 
broadly replicated Slobogin and Schumacher’s results on “traditional police practices” conducted almost 
a quarter of a century earlier. These results suggest that concerns about wildly fluctuating attitudes are 
not well founded. 
 78. Christopher Slobogin, Proportionality, Privacy, and Public Opinion: A Reply to Kerr and 
Swire, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1588, 1603–04 (2010). 
 79. Kugler & Strahilevitz, supra note 25, at 222 (“Jones itself removes the ‘positive law’ model 
from the Katz framework. . . .”). 
 80. Id. at 222. 
 81. Id. at 227. Kugler and Strahilevitz’s concern about police officers leveraging citizens’ 
confusion or ignorance of the applicable law has already been recognized as a problem with respect to 
consent searches. See, e.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 277, 284–85 (1973) (Marshall, 
J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority’s conclusion that police officers need not inform a person they 
can decline to consent to search and arguing that “consent cannot be considered a meaningful choice 
unless he knew that he could in fact exclude the police”); see also United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 
194, 208, 211–12 (2002) (Souter, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority’s conclusion that passengers 
2018] WHY COURTS FAIL TO PROTECT PRIVACY 279 
We share many of these normative concerns, especially in the realm of 
emergent technology, social media, and the new (sometimes semi-public) forms 
that personal communication now take as a result. We find consensus in at least 
one of Kerr’s models—namely the probabilistic model, which requires judges to 
apply the actual expectations of society. If judges and justices are doing so, and 
that is normatively desirable, surely it is better that their conclusions be 
accurate—based on robust empirical data—than limited by their own hunches. 
II. 
EMPIRICAL QUESTIONS AND BACKGROUND 
In the previous section, we explained that the threshold question in Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence—whether police conduct constitutes a search or 
seizure—turns on whether the conduct violates a person’s reasonable 
expectations of privacy or autonomy. Further, we argued that when the Court 
refers to reasonable expectations about privacy and autonomy, it does or should 
refer to societal norms or beliefs, which raises the empirical questions we test 
herein. 
In this Part, we explore potential biases and distortions that may make it 
difficult for judges to perform accurately the task of assessing societal 
expectations of privacy. Whether they succeed is the empirical question we test 
below. We also review the prior empirical literature that attempts to quantify 
those social expectations. 
A. The Innocent Person Being Searched versus Hindsight Bias 
Here, we sharpen the doctrinal question in the definition of searches and 
seizures to focus on the perspective of an innocent person who is the subject of 
the potential search or seizure. While the Fourth Amendment jurisprudence 
declares that reasonable expectations of privacy be judged from the perspective 
of an innocent person, in practice those assessments are typically made in 
hindsight in the context of suppression hearings or after the accused has been 
found guilty. Our empirical study then asks whether making decisions in these 
contexts might distort the results so that they do not reflect the outcomes that we 
would expect if decisions were truly made from the perspective of an innocent 
person. 
The presumption of innocence is a fundamental pillar of the criminal justice 
system.82 Accordingly, if the police find incriminating evidence, the success of 
that search cannot itself inform the question of whether the search was proper. 
 
on a bus were not seized and consented to being searched, because “[t]he reasonable inference was that 
the ‘interdiction’ was not a consensual exercise, but one the police would carry out whatever the 
circumstances; that they would prefer ‘cooperation’ but would not let the lack of it stand in their way”). 
 82. See Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895); James Bradley Thayer, The 
Presumption of Innocence in Criminal Cases, 6 YALE L.J. 185, 188–89 (1896). 
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After all, “[t]he Fourth Amendment aims to protect the privacy of all individuals 
against government intrusion.”83 
On the other hand, the Supreme Court has repeatedly declared that there is 
no reasonable or legitimate expectation of privacy in criminal conduct or 
contraband. For example, in Rakas v. Illinois,84 the Court stated that: 
A burglar plying his trade in a summer cabin during the off season may 
have a thoroughly justified subjective expectation of privacy, but it is 
not one which the law recognizes as “legitimate.” His presence . . . is 
“wrongful”; his expectation is not “one that society is prepared to 
recognize as “reasonable.”85 
Similarly, the Court has stated on several occasions that investigative 
techniques that only indicate the presence of contraband substances do not 
violate any reasonable expectations of privacy. The Court on this basis has held 
that a trained narcotics detection dog performing a “sniff test” of luggage does 
not violate the luggage owner’s reasonable expectations of privacy, and therefore 
is not a search for Fourth Amendment purposes.86 The Court explained that: 
A “canine sniff” by a well-trained narcotics detection dog . . . does not 
require opening the luggage. It does not expose noncontraband [sic] 
items that otherwise would remain hidden from public view, as does, for 
example, an officer’s rummaging through the contents of the luggage. 
. . . Moreover, the sniff discloses only the presence or absence of 
narcotics, a contraband item. . . . This limited disclosure also ensures 
that the owner of the property is not subjected to the embarrassment and 
inconvenience entailed in less discriminate and more intrusive 
investigative methods.87 
The Court has applied this logic to the use of drug detection dogs to 
determine the presence of illegal drugs in cars.88 The Court also used the same 
reasoning in United States v. Jacobsen89 to hold that a field chemical test for 
narcotics was not a Fourth Amendment search. The Court reasoned: 
A chemical test that merely discloses whether or not a particular 
substance is cocaine does not compromise any legitimate interest in 
privacy . . . [V]irtually all of the tests conducted . . . would result in a 
 
 83. Shima Baradaran, Rebalancing the Fourth Amendment, 102 GEO. L.J. 1 (2013). 
 84. 439 U.S. 128 (1978). 
 85. Id. at 143 n.12 (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., 
concurring)); see also Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 7, at 732 (quoting Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143 
n.12, and concluding that “[i]n short, the Fourth Amendment does not protect expectations of privacy 
that only a criminal would have”). 
 86. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983) (“[E]xposure of respondent’s luggage, 
which was located in a public place, to a trained canine [] did not constitute a ‘search’ within the meaning 
of the Fourth Amendment.”). 
 87. Id. 
 88. See, e.g., Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 40 (2000) (holding that an exterior sniff is 
not a search); see also Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409 (2005) (holding that the use of narcotics 
dog to sniff exterior of vehicle during lawful traffic stop not a search). 
 89. 466 U.S. 109 (1984). 
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positive finding; in such cases, no legitimate interest has been 
compromised. But even if the results are negative—merely disclosing 
that the substance is something other than cocaine—such a result reveals 
nothing of special interest. Congress has decided . . . to treat the interest 
in “privately” possessing cocaine as illegitimate; thus governmental 
conduct that can reveal whether a substance is cocaine, and no other 
arguably “private” fact, compromises no legitimate privacy interest.90 
In other words, government investigative conduct only violates reasonable 
expectations of privacy if there is some possibility that the conduct will expose 
an innocent private fact. For example, the physical search of luggage violates 
reasonable expectations of privacy because, unlike a canine sniff of the exterior, 
physically opening luggage potentially exposes non-contraband items contained 
in the luggage—therefore potentially exposing the owner of the luggage to 
“embarrassment and inconvenience.”91 Thus, when examining whether 
government conduct violates reasonable expectations of privacy, the Court 
considers whether the conduct could conceivably reveal innocent, private 
information—such as “letters or photographs”92 or “at what hour each night the 
lady of the house takes her daily sauna and bath.”93 
The Court’s search cases therefore demonstrate that the determination of 
whether governmental conduct violates reasonable expectations of privacy 
assumes that the target of the conduct is innocent of any criminal wrongdoing. 
The investigative conduct can only violate reasonable privacy expectations if it 
could conceivably reveal innocent information. 
Moreover, the Court has also instructed that courts apply the innocent-
person perspective to determine whether government conduct is a seizure (as 
opposed to whether it is a search). In Florida v. Bostick,94 for example, the Court 
addressed whether police seized defendants during a “drug interdiction” on a 
long haul bus. In holding that the defendants were not seized because a 
reasonable person would have felt free to terminate the police encounter, the 
Court explicitly stated that “the ‘reasonable person’ test presupposes an innocent 
 
 90. Id. at 123; see also Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 519 n.4 (1983) (Blackmun, J., 
dissenting), cited with approval by Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991). “The fact that Royer knew 
the search was likely to turn up contraband is of course irrelevant; the potential intrusiveness of the 
officers’ conduct must be judged from the viewpoint of an innocent person in Royer’s position.” Royer, 
460 U.S. at 519 n.4; see also Arnold H. Loewy, The Fourth Amendment as a Device for Protecting the 
Innocent, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1229 (1983). 
 91. Place, 462 U.S. at 707. 
 92. Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 325 (1987) (“It matters not that the search uncovered 
nothing of any great personal value to respondent . . . rather than (what might conceivably have been 
hidden behind or under the equipment) letters or photographs.”). 
 93. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 38 (2001); see also Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 
170, 192 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing that there is a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
privately owned, undeveloped land because “many landowners like to take solitary walks,” “meet 
lovers” or “fellow worshippers,” or conduct other criminally innocent activities on their properties). 
 94. 501 U.S. 429 (1991). 
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person.”95 Similarly, in Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz,96 the Court 
considered the degree of intrusion that a roadside sobriety checkpoint imposed 
from the point of view of the innocent driver: “The ‘fear and surprise’ to be 
considered are not the natural fear of one who has been drinking over the 
prospect of being stopped at a sobriety checkpoint but, rather, the fear and 
surprise engendered in law-abiding motorists by the nature of the stop.”97 
All of this suggests that the innocent person is the lodestar of Fourth 
Amendment analyses. Nonetheless, efforts to enforce the amendment’s 
protections are almost “always presented to courts by a criminal defendant whose 
hands are dirty.”98 Courts typically make these assessments in the context of 
suppression hearings, where a search yielded incriminating evidence, which is 
itself squarely before the court.99 A judge’s exposure to that information could 
well bias the court against more robust applications of the Fourth Amendment. 
Rarely do Fourth Amendment issues arise in cases without incriminating 
evidence. Although individuals can sue for Fourth Amendment violations under 
42 U.S.C. § 1983, Fourth Amendment cases are usually brought when the police 
have failed to find incriminating evidence.100 § 1983 claims are far less common 
than suppression hearings and appeals of decisions about whether to suppress 
evidence in criminal trials.101 This is certainly the case when we look at Supreme 
Court decisions. In case after case, the Justices knew of incriminating evidence 
that the police found when they decided whether particular conduct violated a 
person’s reasonable expectations of privacy.102 
 
 95. Id. at 438. 
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at trial the same GPS-derived locational data . . . which connected Jones to the alleged conspirators’ 
stash house that contained $850,000 in cash, 97 kilograms of cocaine, and 1 kilogram of cocaine base.”); 
Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 431 (1991) (holding that police officers did not seize the defendant 
when they boarded a long-haul bus at a scheduled stop and “discovered cocaine when they searched a 
suitcase belonging to [the defendant]”); Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 173 (1984) (holding that 
police officers trespass onto private land outside the curtilage, which revealed “a field of marihuana,” 
was not a search); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 455–56 (1928) (holding a federal wiretap 
was not a search, wherein it “disclose[d] a conspiracy of amazing magnitude to import, possess, and sell 
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Although judges know that they should not consider incriminating evidence 
in determining whether a search or seizure violated the Fourth Amendment, it is 
easier said than done. Indeed, the Supreme Court acknowledged this problem in 
Beck v. Ohio when they suggested that decisions made before a search takes 
place are more reliable than those made afterwards because of concerns of 
“hindsight judgment.”103 Psychological studies have confirmed that individuals 
are susceptible to hindsight bias. Accordingly, we hypothesize that exposure to 
incriminating evidence can reduce the likelihood of judges finding a violation of 
reasonable expectations of privacy than they would absent that exposure. If true, 
this suggests that courts might be under-protecting privacy interests under the 
Fourth Amendment. 
Numerous studies have shown that hindsight bias can impact decision 
making. As early as 1975, Baruch Fishhoff demonstrated that when people know 
of a particular outcome, they tend to overestimate the likelihood of that 
outcome.104 Jeffrey Rachlinski has provided an exhaustive catalog of studies 
demonstrating this type of hindsight bias in a broad range of contexts.105 These 
include studies that ask individuals to predict the likelihood of events as disparate 
as the consequences of diplomatic missions and the findings of the Rodney King 
case.106 But hindsight bias is not limited to misestimating likelihoods. 
Another related form of hindsight bias is sometimes called “outcome 
bias.”107 Outcome bias occurs when the consequences of a decision have 
inordinate influence on the assessment of that decision’s quality. In some cases, 
 
liquor unlawfully,” including “the employment of not less than 50 persons, of two sea-going vessels for 
the transportation of liquor to British Columbia, of smaller vessels for coastwise transportation to the 
state of Washington” and aggregate annual sales that “must have exceeded $2,000,000”). 
 103. 379 U.S. 89, 96 (1964) (“An arrest without a warrant bypasses the safeguards provided by 
an objective predetermination of probable cause, and substitutes instead the far less reliable procedure 
on an after-the-event justification for the arrest or search, too likely to be subtly influenced by the familiar 
shortcomings of hindsight judgment.”); see also Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959) (Douglas, 
J., dissenting) (“Decisions under the Fourth Amendment, taken in the long view, have not given the 
protection to the citizen which the letter and spirit of the Amendment would seem to require. One reason, 
I think, is that wherever a culprit is caught red-handed, as in leading Fourth Amendment cases, it is 
difficult to adopt and enforce a rule that would turn him loose.”); William J. Stuntz, Warrants and Fourth 
Amendment Remedies, 77 VA. L. REV. 881, 915 (1991) (arguing that granting warrants before a 
magistrate knows whether the police will find evidence or whether the suspect is a criminal helps 
eliminate judicial bias). 
 104. Baruch Fischhoff, Hindsight ≠ Foresight: The Effect of Outcome Knowledge on Judgment 
Under Uncertainty, 1 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: HUM. PERCEPTION & PERFORMANCE 288 (1975). 
 105. Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight, 65 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 571, 578–80 (1998). 
 106. See Baruch Fischhoff & Ruth Beyth, “I Knew It Would Happen”: Remembered 
Probabilities of Once-Future Things, 13 ORG. BEH. & HUM. PERFORMANCE 1, 6–7 (1975) (discussing 
Nixon’s 1972 diplomatic missions to China and Russia); Lee J. Gilbertson et al., A Study of Hindsight 
Bias: The Rodney King Case in Retrospect, 74 PSYCH. REP. 383, 385 (1994). 
 107. The nomenclature is inconsistent. Sometimes scholars simply call this phenomenon 
“hindsight bias” while others consider it a separate but related phenomenon called outcome bias. From 
this point onwards, we use the term outcome bias except when quoting others. 
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using outcomes to assess actions is perfectly logical.108 For example, when a 
toaster explodes, evidence tends to show that some defect caused the explosion. 
Thus, it is hardly surprising that people associate positive outcomes with good 
decisions and negative outcomes with poor decisions. 
In contrast, outcome bias exists when evidence of outcome is given too 
much weight—or in its extreme form, when that evidence should have no bearing 
on the decision at issue. Determining whether particular conduct is a search that 
the Fourth Amendment protects falls into this latter category. The legal test asks 
whether the police violated the subject’s reasonable expectations of privacy. 
Those expectations are unrelated to whether or not incriminating evidence is 
found. To the extent that incriminating evidence plays a role in classifying 
conduct as searches, it is fair to say those decisions suffer from outcome bias. 
Studies have shown outcome bias occurs in many contexts.109 For example, 
Jonathan Baron and John Hershey found that individuals evaluated the same sets 
of physician decisions differently depending on whether they were told the 
outcome was a success or a failure.110 In one of their experiments, participants 
concluded that the same physician decisions were more “correct” than 
“incorrect” when particular treatments were successful.111 Kim Kamin and 
Jeffrey Rachlinski found outcome bias when assessing the need for anti-flood 
precautions.112 Reid Hastie, David Schkade, and John Payne found that 
individuals were less likely to conclude that a train was safe to operate after they 
were told it had an accident.113 
More importantly for our purposes, two studies have tested hindsight bias 
in the context of Fourth Amendment searches with somewhat contradictory 
findings. In 1989, Jonathan Casper, Kennette Benedict, and Jo Perry tested 
outcome bias in a § 1983 civil rights action.114 They demonstrated that when 
mock jurors were told that the search found evidence of illegal conduct, the mock 
jurors were nine percent less likely to find the police liable for violating the 
 
 108. See Maggie Wittlin, Hindsight Evidence, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 1323, 1334 (2016) (“When 
one occurrence tends to lead to another, evidence of the second occurrence is suggestive of the first.”); 
Fischhoff & Beyth, supra note 106, at 2 (“[I]n many cases the postdictive probability of events which 
have happened is justifiably higher than the corresponding predictive probability.”). 
 109. See Jay J.J. Christensen-Szalanski & Cynthia Fobian Willham, The Hindsight Bias: A Meta-
Analysis, 48 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 147 (1991) (reviewing 122 studies of 
hindsight bias). 
 110. See Jonathan Baron & John C. Hershey, Outcome Bias in Decision Evaluation, 54 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 569, 571–74 (1988). 
 111. Id. at 571–72. 
 112. Kim A. Kamin & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Ex Post ≠ Ex Ante: Determining Liability in 
Hindsight, 19 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 89, 98 (1995). 
 113. See Reid Hastie, David A. Schkade & John W. Payne, Juror Judgments in Civil Cases: 
Hindsight Effects on Judgments of Liability for Punitive Damages, 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 597, 609–
10 (1999). 
 114. Jonathan D. Casper, Kennette Benedict & Jo L. Perry, Juror Decision Making, Attitudes, 
and the Hindsight Bias, 13 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 291 (1989). 
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subject’s civil rights.115 Moreover, to the extent the mock jurors did find liability, 
they awarded both smaller compensatory and punitive damage awards.116 
Subsequently, Jeffrey Rachlinski, Chris Guthrie, and Andrew Wistrich 
conducted a series of experiments aimed at determining whether hindsight bias 
affected judges’ decision making. In most of the experiments, they found that 
hindsight bias affected judges to a similar degree as ordinary people.117 However, 
in one experiment they found an anomaly: hindsight bias did not appear to affect 
judges when making probable cause determinations.118 In that experiment, 
researchers gave one group of judges a factual pattern and asked them if there 
was sufficient probable cause to issue a search warrant (i.e., the foresight 
condition). The researchers then gave a second group of judges the same factual 
pattern but told them that the search had found incriminating evidence (i.e., the 
hindsight condition).119 Researchers also asked them whether there was probable 
cause, but in the context of a suppression hearing. In the foresight condition, 
23.9% (11 out of 46) of the judges concluded that there was probable cause for 
a search and granted a warrant and, in the hindsight condition, 27.7% (13 out of 
47) of the judges concluded that there was probable cause for a search and 
admitted the testimony.120 Relying on this data, the authors concluded that 
“[j]udges were able to ignore the damning evidence that the search produced and 
make essentially the same decision as judges who were unaware of what the 
search would uncover.”121 
Concerned that their first experiment was insufficiently powered, 
Rachlinski et al. proceeded to conduct three more experiments to test whether 
hindsight bias affected judges as they made probable cause determinations.122 
Combining the results from these experiments, they found that 41.6% (126 out 
of 303) of judges found probable cause in the foresight conditions and 45.4% 
 
 115. Id. at 299 (across all three types of criminal activity tested). 
 116. Id. at 299–300. 
 117. See Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, The “Hidden Judiciary”: An 
Empirical Examination of Executive Branch Justice, 58 DUKE L.J. 1477, 1512–16 (2009) (finding 
hindsight bias affected state judges’ decisions); Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. 
Wistrich, Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777, 818 (2001) (finding that the magnitude of 
the effects of hindsight bias in judges was comparable to that found when studying mock juries and 
laypersons); Andrew J. Wistrich, Chris Guthrie & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Can Judges Ignore Inadmissible 
Information? The Difficulty of Deliberately Disregarding, 153 U. PENN. L. REV. 1251, 1323 (2005) 
(finding hindsight bias in most contexts in seven experiments). 
 118. Wistrich et al., supra note 117, at 1283. 
 119. The evidence was “10 pounds of methamphetamine, other drug paraphernalia, and a gun 
that had recently been fired.” Id. at 1315. 
 120. Id. at 1316. 
 121. Id. at 1317. 
 122. Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Chris Guthrie & Andrew J. Wistrich, Probable Cause, Probability, 
and Hindsight, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 72, 75–76 (2011). Indeed, using their data, our own 
calculations suggests that the 95% confidence of their first experiment was between negative 15% to a 
positive 22%. Thus, these results do not disprove the existence of hindsight bias. On the importance of 
using confidence intervals, see John M. Hoenig & Dennis M. Heisey, The Abuse of Power: The 
Pervasive Fallacy of Power Calculations for Data Analysis, 55 AM. STATISTICIAN 19 (2001). 
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(132 out of 291) found probable cause in the hindsight conditions.123 Rachlinski 
et al. summarized their findings: “Judges seem able to overcome a pervasive 
cognitive bias in judgment on an important aspect of the criminal justice 
system.”124 
Now one may suppose that judges’ special training and education may 
allow them to perform better than the mock jurors in Casper’s study.125 We 
remain skeptical. As Rachlinski and his co-authors acknowledge, their findings 
are inconsistent with the vast body of literature on hindsight bias, including their 
own previous studies that found that hindsight bias does affect judges.126 
Moreover, we have two specific concerns about their most recent results. First, 
the team’s very success may have adversely affected their ability to repeat the 
same kind of experiment with more judges. Judges may be getting “savvy” to 
their tests.127 If judges had read the team’s prior published work or talked with 
past participants in any of the other nine judicial conferences where the 
experiments were run, they may have become aware of the purpose of the 
experiment.128 It is not apparent from the papers whether the authors examined 
this particular threat to validity by, for example, asking respondents what they 
believed was the purpose of the study. 
Second, the studies cover different scenarios. Therefore, it is not 
appropriate to simply aggregate the results as if they represented one experiment. 
A better approach would be to use a logistic regression that treats each study as 
a separate factor. We performed such an analysis and found that the results point 
in the direction of hindsight bias but are not statistically significant at the p = .05 
level.129 In other words, the 95% confidence interval includes the possibilities 
that hindsight information may either increase or decrease the likelihood that a 
judge would find a Fourth Amendment violation. 
 
 123. Rachlinski et al., supra note 122, at 93. 
 124. Id. at 98. 
 125. Id. at 96–97. 
 126. See supra notes 109–18 and accompanying text. Nancy Leong has also found that civil 
plaintiff’s asserting Fourth Amendments claims are far more successful than criminal defendants 
asserting a Fourth Amendment defense. Unfortunately, it is impossible to disentangle sample biases 
because the civil cases are likely to differ significantly from their criminal counterparts. See Leong, 
supra note 100, at 429; see also Jeffrey A. Segal & Benjamin Woodson, Motivated Cognition on the 
Bench: Does Criminal Egregiousness Influence Judges’ Admissibility Decisions in Search-and-Seizure 
Cases? 23–24 (Apr. 23, 2014) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with California Law Review) 
(analyzing 558 search and seizure decisions and concluding that judges consider the seriousness of the 
crime when making exclusionary rule decisions, but only for the most intrusive searches). 
 127. See Yanna Krupnikov & Adam Seth Levine, Cross-Sample Comparisons and External 
Validity, 1 J. EXPERIMENTAL POL. SCI. 59, 62 (2014) (describing how knowledge of experimental 
manipulations can contaminate responses). 
 128. See Rachlinski et al., supra note 122, at 76 (explaining that the studies were conducted across 
ten judicial conferences). On the importance of blinding social science research, see generally 
CHRISTOPHER T. ROBERTSON & AARON S. KESSELHEIM, BLINDING AS A SOLUTION TO BIAS: 
STRENGTHENING BIOMEDICAL SCIENCE, FORENSIC SCIENCE, AND LAW (2016). 
 129. The log of the ratio of the odds of granting with hindsight to granting without hindsight was 
0.166 (p =.339). The 95% confidence interval ranges from -0.174 to 0.506. 
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B. The First Person Perspective versus Egocentrism 
The Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment decisions also make it clear a 
person’s reasonable expectations of privacy should be judged from the subjective 
perspective of the person being searched.130 Although the test is not merely 
subjective (based on the peculiar beliefs of the actual person being searched), the 
reasonableness is judged from the perspective of the person being investigated 
or restrained, not from the perspective of an impartial bystander. 
This first person perspective is evident in Katz itself. The first prong of the 
Katz two-part test is whether the person being investigated “exhibited an actual 
[subjective] expectation of privacy.”131 The second prong asks whether that 
expectation of privacy—that is, the actual expectation the person investigated 
subjectively held—is “one that society is prepared to recognize as 
‘reasonable.’”132 
The Supreme Court’s subsequent application of the Katz test makes clear 
that the test of reasonableness is considered from the first person perspective. To 
take but one example, in the Ciraolo decision discussed above, the Court 
concluded that “respondent’s expectation that his garden was protected from 
such observation is unreasonable,”133 and “it is unreasonable for respondent to 
expect that his marijuana plants were constitutionally protected from being 
observed with the naked eye from an altitude of 1,000 feet.”134 
Nonetheless, when judges actually make such determinations about the 
intrusiveness of police conduct, they are never the subject of the search. They 
are sitting in judgment. 
We hypothesize that judges will evaluate actions directed against others 
less harshly than actions directed to themselves. This would be a kind of 
egocentric bias. Studies have shown that perspective can affect moral judgments. 
People provide higher estimates of what is a fair wage or a fair settlement when 
they assume that the outcome will benefit them.135 One experiment even 
demonstrated that students characterized librarians as more moral (honest, fair, 
and proper) when the librarians broke rules (i.e., waived fines) that benefited the 
students as opposed to others.136 Thus, the typical understanding of self-interest 
 
 130. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 438 (1991) (citing with approval Florida v. Royer, 460 
U.S. 491, 519 n.4 (1983) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)). 
 131. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 132. Id. 
 133. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 214 (1986) (emphasis added). 
 134. Id. at 215 (emphasis added). 
 135. David M. Messick & Keith Sentis, Fairness, Preference, and Fairness Biases, in EQUITY 
THEORY: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 135, 153 (David M. Messick & Karen 
S. Cook eds, 1983); George Loewenstein et al., Self-Serving Assessments of Fairness and Pretrial 
Bargaining, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 135, 135–59 (1993). 
 136. Konrad Bocian & Bogdan Wojciszke, Self-Interest Bias in Moral Judgments of Others’ 
Actions, 40 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1, 4–5 (2014). 
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bias in the moral decision-making context is that individuals find behavior to be 
fairer or more just when it benefits them. 
A natural corollary is that individuals are likely to characterize behavior as 
less fair when it harms them. Thus, when police conduct is directed at a person, 
that person is more likely to think that such conduct is unfair (first person), or in 
the language of the Fourth Amendment “unreasonable,” than when the same 
conduct is directed at another person (third person). If judges are susceptible to 
this kind of self-interest bias, we would expect them to be less likely to find that 
the Fourth Amendment protects against police searches. 
Self-interest may not be the only explanation for egocentric biases. 
Nicholas Epley and Eugene Caruso suggest a different explanation. They argue 
that people make moral judgments using their own perspective because of 
“automatic and unconscious psychological mechanisms.”137 But regardless of 
the root cause of egocentric biases, our hypothesis is that such a bias may be 
present in the Fourth Amendment context. If it is present, we would expect to 
see courts under-protect an individual’s Fourth Amendment rights.138 
Slobogin and Schumacher tested this very issue. They found “clear support 
for the proposition that searches and seizures tend to be viewed as more intrusive 
when their target is the subject-participant rather than ‘another’ . . . .”139 Kugler 
and Strahilevitz also found a “slight[]” first person effect.140 Our study seeks to 
replicate these findings using a larger and more representative sample. 
Moreover, instead of only using the intrusiveness scale that Slobogin and 
Schumacher used, we also ask participants the question the Supreme Court’s test 
posed: does the conduct described in each scenario violate reasonable 
expectations of privacy? Framing questions in this way may help us understand 
the potential impact of these biases. Specifically, we can learn if there are any 
scenarios where participants would say that their expectations of privacy are not 
violated in the third person/no outcome condition, but are violated in the first 
person/outcome condition. 
C. Criminal Justice Experience, Race, Ethnicity, and Gender 
The members of the judiciary who decide Fourth Amendment questions on 
behalf of the American society are not representative of the nation as a whole. 
 
 137. Nicholas Epley & Eugene M. Caruso, Egocentric Ethics, 17 SOC. JUST. RES. 171, 173 
(2004). 
 138. We make no claims that the first person perspective is actually better than the third-person 
for purpose of determining what conduct should be classified as a search under the Fourth Amendment. 
Rather we simply accept the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence and suggest that judges may have difficulty 
correctly applying the existing standard because of egocentric bias. 
 139. Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 7, at 759–60. The study had participants rated 50 
scenarios’ “intrusiveness” on a scale from 1 to 100. Participant responses to scenarios framed in the first 
person averaged 60.3 while responses to those framed in the third person averaged 56.3 (p < .05). Id. at 
759–60 & n.109. 
 140. Kugler & Strahilevitz, supra note 25, at 248 n.170. 
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Though trends are complex, prior literature shows demographic factors may 
shape a wide range of perceptions.141 If demographic factors shape perceptions 
of police activities, differences between the demographics of the public and the 
judiciary could systematically distort decisions concerning potential Fourth 
Amendment violations. For this analysis, we review the demographics of the 
federal judiciary as well as state judiciaries, whose criminal docket dwarfs the 
federal docket.142 
African Americans and Hispanics are also much more likely to be 
imprisoned in the U.S.143 They are also more likely to be the subject of a police 
search.144 Recently, litigation over New York’s stop and frisk policy concluded 
that “the NYPD carries out more stops in areas with more black and Hispanic 
residents, even when other relevant variables are held constant,” and “within any 
area, regardless of its racial composition, blacks and Hispanics are more likely 
to be stopped than whites.”145 These experiences with the criminal justice system 
could shape perceptions of the police among the defendants, their friends, and 
their families.146 In comparison to the most often targeted minority populations, 
judges presumably have little experience as the target of a police investigation 
or incarceration. 
 
 141. See, e.g., Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, et al., Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges?, 
84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1195 (2009) (reporting experiments with actual judges showing implicit 
biases, which were not consistently evoked in simulated judicial decisions); Sunita Sah, Christopher T. 
Robertson & Shima B. Baughman, Blinding Prosecutors to Defendants’ Race: A Policy Proposal to 
Reduce Unconscious Bias in the Criminal Justice System, 1 BEHAV. SCI. & POL’Y 69, 69–76 (2015) 
(reviewing the literature for race in the context of prosecutorial decision making); Max Schanzenbach, 
Racial and Sex Disparities in Prison Sentences: The Effect of District-level Judicial Demographics, 34 
J. LEGAL STUD. 57, 57–92 (2005) (finding that “judges’ race and sex have little influence on prison 
sentences in general but do affect racial and sex disparities”). 
 142. State courts handled 1.1 million felony convictions in a recent year versus 80,000 federal 
defendants sentenced. See MATTHEW R. DUROSE & PATRICK A. LANGAN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
STATISTICS, NCJ 215646, FELONY SENTENCES IN STATE COURTS, 2004 (2007), 
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fssc04.pdf [https://perma.cc/63L2-6UQU]. 
 143. See PAUL GUERINO, PAIGE M. HARRISON & WILLIAM J. SABOL, BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
STATISTICS, NCJ 236096, PRISONERS IN 2010, at 7 (2012), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p10.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/P5K3-J5NL] (internal citation omitted) (“[B]lack non-Hispanic males had an 
imprisonment rate (3,074 per 100,000 U.S. black male residents) that was nearly 7 times higher than 
white non-Hispanic males (459 per 100,000).”); see also id. at 26 (providing statistics for Hispanic 
prisoners). 
 144. See, e.g., BERNARD E. HARCOURT, ILLUSION OF ORDER: THE FALSE PROMISE OF BROKEN 
WINDOWS POLICING 173–75 (2001) (discussing New York City’s stop-and-frisk policy’s 
disproportionate effect on racial minorities); DAVID A. HARRIS, PROFILES IN INJUSTICE: WHY RACIAL 
PROFILING CANNOT WORK 62–64 (2002) (discussing racial disparities in stopping and searching 
motorists). 
 145. Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 589 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
 146. See Tom R. Tyler, Jeffrey Fagan & Amanda Geller, Street Stops and Police Legitimacy: 
Teachable Moments in Young Urban Men’s Legal Socialization, 11 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 751 
(2014). 
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Unsurprisingly, the judiciary tends to be more male, white, affluent, and 
educated than ordinary members of the public.147 While women comprise 
slightly more than half the general population, they only make up 37 percent of 
active U.S. Circuit Court judges and 34 percent of active U.S. District Court 
judges.148 The numbers for women on the state court level are similar to the 
federal numbers, and not a single state has as many women judges as men.149 
The story is more nuanced for African American judges. While they are 
now fairly well-represented in the federal judiciary, that has not historically been 
the case. In 2010, African Americans made up 12.6 percent of the U.S. 
population.150 The numbers for active federal courts now roughly corresponds to 
that number: 13 percent of active U.S. Circuit Court judges and 14 percent of 
active U.S. District Court judges are African American.151 However, if we look 
at judges that have taken senior status (as of March 7, 2014), the numbers drop 
to 5.3 percent and 6.6 percent, respectively.152 Since senior judges are those who 
have been serving for longer periods of time, it is fair to suggest that African 
American federal judges have likely decided proportionately fewer Fourth 
Amendment cases. That suggests that African American federal judges likely 
have had less impact on the precedent—going back as far as fifty years on what 
constitutes reasonable expectations of privacy—that now shapes decisions. In 
addition, state courts are not nearly as representative as the federal judiciary. As 
of 2014, African Americans only made up 7.2 percent of state court judges.153 
Hispanics are still underrepresented on both the federal and state benches. 
In 2010, Hispanics made up 17.3 percent of the population.154 Yet, as of 2014, 
Hispanics only made up 9 percent of active and 3.5 percent of senior federal 
circuit court judges, and 10 percent of active and 3.2 percent of senior federal 
district court judges.155 Their numbers were even smaller at the state level, 
making up only 5.4 percent of state court judges.156 
Judges are also more educated and wealthier than typical Americans. By 
virtue of their position, they all (or substantially all) have a law degree, while 
 
 147. One recent study found that white men are the most overrepresented group (nearly double 
the numbers found in the general population). TRACEY E. GEORGE & ALBERT H. YOON, AM. 
CONSTITUTION SOC’Y, THE GAVEL GAP: WHO SITS IN JUDGMENT ON STATE COURTS? 7 (2016). 
 148. See BARRY J. MCMILLION, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., U.S. CIRCUIT AND DISTRICT COURT 
JUDGES: PROFILE OF SELECT CHARACTERISTICS 4, 15 (2017), http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43426.pdf 
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 151. MCMILLION, supra note 148, at 5, 17. 
 152. See BARRY J. MCMILLION, U.S. CIRCUIT AND DISTRICT COURT JUDGES: PROFILE OF 
SELECT CHARACTERISTICS 13, 21 (2014) [hereinafter MCMILLION 2014]. 
 153. GEORGE & YOON, supra note 147, at 18 tbl.A-7. 
 154. See Appendix B. 
 155. MCMILLION 2014, supra note 152, at 13, 21. 
 156. GEORGE & YOON, supra note 147, at 18 tbl.A-7. 
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only 1.4 percent of the general population have a professional degree.157 Judicial 
salaries uniformly exceed $100,000, sometimes by a great deal,158 while the large 
majority of Americans make substantially less than this amount.159 Given these 
additional differences in demographics, it would not be surprising if judges’ 
attitudes differed from the population at large. If these demographic disparities 
cause disparities in perceptions of police activities, such a result would, on the 
Court’s own terms, undermine the Court’s decisions and jurisprudence on what 
constitutes a Fourth Amendment search or seizure. Such a result would raise 
questions about the sociological legitimacy of police behavior, which relies on 
the legal doctrine. 
D. Prior Studies on Expectations of Privacy 
Several prior empirical studies have investigated reasonable expectations 
of privacy. Slobogin and Schumacher’s landmark 1993 study assessed the 
relative level of “intrusiveness” of different types police conduct.160 They asked 
217 participants to rate fifty scenarios on a 1-100 “intrusiveness” scale.161 In 
addition to testing attitudes given particular scenarios, Slobogin and Schumacher 
sought to test whether first person bias and/or context affected people’s attitudes. 
They posed scenarios either as if they were happening to the participant (first 
person) or someone else (third person). In another manipulation, they told one 
group of participants what evidence the police were hoping to obtain while 
withholding this information from another group.162 
While Slobogin and Schumacher found that in many cases individual 
attitudes generally corresponded to Supreme Court jurisprudence, in other areas 
they found that the Court often underestimated what members of the public 
thought was private.163 Perhaps more importantly, they also explored why Court 
doctrine might differ from the ordinary person’s privacy views. They found that 
individuals saw conduct as more intrusive when presented with scenarios in the 
first person condition than when presented in the third person, which corresponds 
to a judge’s third person perspective.164 Additionally, when individuals were not 
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and 6.7 percent respectively). 
 158. CIARA TORRES-SPELLISCY, MONIQUE CHASE & EMMA GREENMAN, BRENNAN CTR. FOR 
JUSTICE, IMPROVING JUDICIAL DIVERSITY (2010); WOMEN AND THE LAW 50 app.E (Jane C. Moriarty 
ed., 2009) (surveying judicial salaries in ten states which all exceed $100,000). The base salary of a U.S. 
District Judge in 2017 is $205,100. See Judicial Compensation, U.S. COURTS, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-compensation [https://perma.cc/3CQH-RVU3]. 
 159. See Appendix B (showing that the percentage of Americans that make more and less than 
$50,000 is fairly evenly split). 
 160. Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 7. 
 161. Id. at 735–39. 
 162. Id. at 732, 735–36. 
 163. Id. at 739–42. Slobogin & Schumacher note that attitudes and court doctrine diverged in the 
use of undercover agents and dog sniffing, among others. Id. 
 164. Id. at 759–61. 
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told the search’s objective, they found the conduct less intrusive.165 The authors 
interpret their results as suggesting that the courts, which commonly make 
decisions knowing that evidence has been found, “underestimate the 
intrusiveness of police actions . . . .”166 
While Slobogin and Schumacher’s study was groundbreaking for its time, 
their sample was both small and unrepresentative. With the exception of twenty-
five citizens of Gainesville, Florida, the 217 participants were students, some 
from Australia.167 Moreover, while the authors speculated that participants may 
have been using hindsight bias in their response, the questions actually only told 
participants the objective of the investigation. The questions did not say anything 
about the outcome.168 Because the participants may have taken the questions at 
face value without assuming any particular outcome, the survey was not properly 
designed to test for hindsight/outcome bias.169 
Over the following two decades, researchers conducted a handful of follow-
up studies that focused on narrower issues. However, because these studies often 
used very specific populations, they may not reflect the attitudes of society as a 
whole. For example, in 2002, Slobogin relied on a sample of 190 people called 
for jury duty in Gainesville, Florida, to examine privacy attitudes on the use of 
camera surveillance.170 A few years later, Slobogin surveyed privacy attitudes 
on data mining using seventy-six members of the Gainesville jury pool.171 In a 
2009 study relying on a sample of 159 undergraduate psychology students, 
Jeremy Blumenthal et al. looked at how the severity of the criminal activity in 
question and the type of evidence being sought affected how intrusive 
participants viewed different scenarios.172 
In 2011, Henry Fradella and his colleagues sought to evaluate privacy 
attitudes by using a five-point Likert scale to determine whether participants 
agreed with or disagreed with Fourth Amendment precedent.173 Like Slobogin 
and Schumacher, Fradella et al. found that participants generally had stronger 
views of privacy than the courts did.174 But again, Fradella study’s sample was 
not representative. The “overwhelming number” of the 589 participants were 
 
 165. Id. 
 166. Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 7. 
 167. Id. at 737. 
 168. Id. at 761. 
 169. Id. (discussing the two ways participants could have interpreted these questions). 
 170. Christopher Slobogin, Public Privacy: Camera Surveillance of Public Places and the Right 
to Anonymity, 72 MISS. L.J. 213, 276 (2002). 
 171. Christopher Slobogin, Government Data Mining and the Fourth Amendment, 75 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 317, 335 (2008). 
 172. Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Meera Adya & Jacqueline Mogle, The Multiple Dimensions of 
Privacy: Testing Lay “Expectations of Privacy,” 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 331, 344 (2009). 
 173. Henry F. Fradella et al., Quantifying Katz: Empirically Measuring “Reasonable 
Expectations of Privacy” in the Fourth Amendment Context, 38 AM. J. CRIM. L. 289, 342 (2011) 
(indicating participants could select among the following responses: strongly disagree, disagree, neither 
agree nor disagree, agree, or strongly agree). 
 174. Id. at 362–66. 
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college students and faculty.175 These sorts of studies simply substitute one 
unrepresentative group (the judiciary) for another. 
More recently, studies have begun to use larger and more diverse samples 
to assess whether Supreme Court doctrine is consistent with society’s attitude on 
privacy. Christine Scott-Hayward and her co-authors relied on 1,198 people 
recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk (“MTurk”), an online crowd-sourcing 
marketplace.176 The study sought to assess expectations of privacy in electronic 
information and see whether these attitudes supported the third party doctrine. 
They found that participants felt entitled to higher levels of privacy than the 
courts have provided and that their views were inconsistent with the third party 
doctrine.177 
Although superior to convenience samples of students or local jurors, 
MTurk is still not representative of the U.S. population. Indeed, Kugler and 
Strahilevitz found that “MTurk respondents are significantly more privacy-
protective than the general U.S. population, perhaps because they skew 
younger.”178 Consequently, they argued MTurk samples are not useful to assess 
the base-rate support for privacy-related beliefs in the general population, but 
they did suggest that such samples may be useful to evaluate the relative 
intrusiveness of different searches.179 Such online samples are also useful for 
conducting randomized experiments that test for cognitive biases like the ones 
we study here. In addition, with a large enough sample, it is also possible to 
reweigh responses to correspond to national demographics, as we did for our 
sample. 
In a similar vein, Alison Smith et al. modeled their case on Fradella’s 
method, but used Survey Monkey to recruit a pool of 1,008 participants.180 Smith 
provided the participants with five short vignettes describing police use of 
technology to investigate criminal activity.181 The researchers then gave the 
participants several statements expressing different potential points of view 
about the vignettes and asked them whether they agreed or disagreed with the 
statements using a five-point Likert scale.182 With respect to many specific 
scenarios, Smith’s results confirmed what Fradella found. 
Smith’s study used richer scenarios that more closely resemble the facts 
courts actually encounter. However, her claims of using a “nationally 
 
 175. Id. at 342. Participants were solicited in two ways: through an email invitation to students 
and faculty at eleven colleges and universities and through Facebook. Id. at 346. 
 176. Christine S. Scott-Hayward, Henry F. Fradella & Ryan G. Fischer, Does Privacy Require 
Secrecy? Societal Expectations of Privacy in the Digital Age, 43 AM. J. CRIM. L. 19, 51–52 (2015). 
 177. Id. at 58. 
 178. Kugler & Strahilevitz, supra note 25, at 233 n.113. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Alisa Smith, Sean Madden & Robert P. Barton, An Empirical Examination of Societal 
Expectations of Privacy in The Digital Age of GPS, Cell Phone Towers, & Drones, 26 ALB. L.J. SCI. & 
TECH. 111, 127–29 (2016). 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. at 127. 
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representative respondent sample” appear to be overstated.183 For example, 
women and African Americans are both significantly overrepresented in Smith’s 
sample (as compared to U.S. Census data), making up 54.6 percent and 25.0 
percent of the sample, respectively.184 Our study found that African Americans 
are significantly more protective of their privacy. Accurate population estimates 
would thus require reweighting of the studied sample, an adjustment that is not 
apparent in Smith’s methods. 
Finally, Kugler and Strahilevitz have conducted two studies on the Fourth 
Amendment. In their first study, using a survey firm called Toluna, they recruited 
1,461 participants to mirror the demographics of the U.S. population along 
several dimensions.185 Their study focused on a narrow, albeit important, issue: 
whether the Supreme Court’s so-called “mosaic theory” was consistent with the 
public’s privacy views. Rooted in Jones, mosaic theory suggests that relatively 
short-term GPS monitoring of a person’s movements might be permissible under 
the Fourth Amendment, but longer-term monitoring “impinges on expectations 
of privacy.”186 The study showed that the public disagreed with mosaic theory. 
In fact, “a large majority of Americans always expect privacy in their geolocation 
information, a meaningful minority never expect privacy, and only a tiny 
remnant allow their expectations to depend on surveillance duration.”187 More 
recently, Kugler and Strahilevitz conducted another survey at different points in 
time to test whether expectations of privacy are circular.188 In other words, they 
sought to determine whether Supreme Court decisions change privacy 
expectations.189 Although they found that attitudes changed soon after a Supreme 
Court decision, those effects disappeared after a year or two. The authors 
concluded that privacy expectations are more stable than many predict.190 
III. 
METHODOLOGY 
We conducted an online survey experiment asking 1,200 participants to 
evaluate the reasonableness of eighteen different investigative actions. Thirteen 
are investigative actions that the government is already conducting or is expected 
to conduct in the near future, but whose status as a search the Supreme Court has 
not yet resolved. In addition, participants were also asked to answer questions on 
 
 183. Id. at 114. 
 184. Id. at 130–31. 
 185. Kugler & Strahilevitz, supra note 25, at 245–46. 
 186. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 430 (2012) (Alito, J. concurring). 
 187. Kugler & Strahilevitz, supra note 25, at 209–10. 
 188. Kugler & Strahilevitz, The Myth of Fourth Amendment Circularity, supra note 77, at 1776. 
 189. Id. at 1752 (discussing that under the “circularity” theory, expectations of privacy drive 
Supreme Court precedent, but many legal thinkers suspect that Supreme Court precedent also drives the 
public’s expectations of privacy). 
 190. Id. at 1794. 
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five scenarios on which the Supreme Court has already ruled.191 These five 
scenarios replicate some of Slobogin and Schumacher’s findings and also allow 
us to compare our findings with the views of the Supreme Court. 
For each scenario, we asked participants to answer two questions, which 
served as our primary dependent variables. First, like Slobogin and Schumacher, 
we asked participants to rate each scenario based on the level of intrusiveness 
using a scale from 1 to 100.192 Second, we asked participants to answer whether 
the actions described in each scenario violated “reasonable expectations of 
privacy” with a simple “yes” or “no.” We believe that the second question 
corresponds more closely to the ultimate Fourth Amendment question courts 
have posed and allows us to make more direct comparisons to the doctrinal 
holdings. To avoid ordering effects, the scenarios were presented to participants 
in random order. 
For each of these scenarios, we performed two randomized manipulations 
in between-subjects design, as shown in Table 1 (and more extensively in 
Appendix A). First, we asked some participants to assess the scenarios from the 
first person perspective and others to do so from the third person perspective. In 
other words, we wrote different versions of the same scenario as if it were 
happening to the person answering the survey (i.e., first person) or another 
person (i.e., third person). Second, we manipulated both the instructions and 
questions to test for outcome bias. In one condition, we told participants that the 
police were looking for incriminating evidence, but that the subject of the search 
was innocent. This version of the instructions tracked how courts frame the legal 
standard for determining reasonable expectations of privacy.193 In our second 
condition, we told participants that while the subject of the search must be 
presumed innocent, in fact “the police found evidence of criminal activity.” 
We intended for these two manipulations together to reveal whether 
decision making based on the way judges typically assess reasonable 
expectations of privacy in the real world (third person/outcome) yields different 
results than the way judges are told to make these assessments based on Supreme 






 191. Slobogin used this technique in one later study. Slobogin, supra note 171, at 333–34 (The 
five baseline scenarios tracked established precedent, covering searches of bedrooms, searches of cars, 
pat-downs or frisks, a brief stop for purposes of obtaining identification, and a stop at a roadblock). 
 192. Slobogin was kind enough to provide us a copy of his original survey. 
 193. United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 202 (2002) (quoting Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 
429, 437–38 (1991)) (“The reasonable person test . . . is objective and ‘presupposes an innocent 
person.’”). 
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Table 1. Text Manipulations by Experimental Conditions (2x2 Design) 
 
 First Person Third Person 
No Evidence 
of Crime 
Would it violate your 
reasonable expectations of 
privacy if the conduct 
described in the preceding 
statement occurred? 
Would it violate a person’s 
reasonable expectations of 
privacy if the conduct described in 
the preceding statement occurred? 
Evidence of 
Crime 
Would it violate your 
reasonable expectations of 
privacy if the actions 
described in the preceding 
statement were used to 
obtain evidence that you 
committed a crime? 
Would it violate a person’s 
reasonable expectations of 
privacy if the actions described in 
the preceding statement were used 
to obtain evidence that the person 
committed a crime? 
 
We collected other demographic information, such as political party 
identification, which can be used as a covariate. We also asked about past 
experience with law enforcement of participants as well as their family and close 
friends. To avoid biasing their answers to the privacy questions we asked 
participants about their experience with law enforcement after they had answered 
all the other questions. Moreover, they were not allowed to go back to revise 
their earlier answers. 
We used the Qualtrics platform to recruit participants. Although not a 
probability sample of the U.S. population, Qualtrics recruits participants 
nationwide from diverse panels of persons who have opted in to receiving such 
requests to participate in surveys for compensation. We specified that the firm 
would recruit at least half of the sample from populations other than non-
Hispanic Whites. By surveying more African Americans and Hispanics in 
particular, we hoped to generate sufficient statistical power to assess whether 
these groups had different views about privacy or police conduct than Whites 
may have, thus making an advance on prior studies. 
One thousand two hundred (1,200) participants completed our survey. We 
report the demographic breakdown of these participants across each 
experimental condition in Appendix B. Randomization succeeded in distributing 
these covariates across experimental conditions. With eighteen scenarios per 
respondent, we have 21,600 observations across the four experimental 
conditions. 
Our study included 770 participants that identified as White, 207 as African 
American, 31 as American Indian, 99 as Asian, 8 as Pacific Islander, and 85 as 
other. Hispanic ethnicity was asked as a separate question, as in the U.S. Census. 
Across all the races, 263 participants also identified as Spanish/Hispanic/Latino, 
including 170 who identified as Whites. As compared to the national census, our 
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participants were more female, contained more minorities, and were politically 
more democratic. To approximate national attitudes nonetheless, we reweighted 
answers based on U.S. Census data (and, in the case of politics, national survey 
data).194 The additional calculations did not change our results significantly. 
Nonetheless, we report the reweighted data. 
IV. 
RESULTS 
Figure 1 below illustrates the reweighted data with respect to violations of 
reasonable expectations of privacy for each scenario. For each scenario, we 
plotted responses based on the first person/no evidence version (the hypothetical 
perspective set out by the Supreme Court) in black and the third person/evidence 
version (the perspective from which most such decisions are actually made) in 
red. Each vertical line corresponds to a 95% confidence interval with the point 
representing the mean response.195 
For examples of how to interpret this data, observe the black dot in the top 
right corner, which shows that almost all of the respondents found that GPS 
tracking violated their reasonable expectations of privacy and especially so when 
asked about themselves as an innocent person. On the other hand, less than a 
quarter of respondents found a privacy violation in the roadblock of a guilty third 
party (the red dot in the lower left corner). We further illustrate these effects in 
our discussion of each result. 
 
 194. The weighting was carried out using multiple iterative proportional fitting as implemented 
in the R package. Johan Barthelemy, Thomas Suesse & Mohammad Namazi-Rad, CRAN—Package 
mipfp, COMPREHENSIVE R ARCHIVE NETWORK (Dec. 1, 2016), https://CRAN.R-
project.org/package=mipfp [https://perma.cc/W9DH-3VDM] (R package version 3.0-1). The 
demographic target proportions rounded to two places are as shown in Appendix B. These proportions 
were condensed from U.S. demographic proportions to capture subgroups in the sample with distinct 
response patterns, while avoiding excessive numbers of cells with low populations. For details of the 
target weights, see Appendix B. 
 195. The variance computation uses variance decomposition and the delta method for estimating 
the variance of the weight matrix. See Hao Lu & Andrew Gelman, A Method for Estimating Design-
Based Sampling Variances for Surveys with Weighting, Poststratification, and Raking, 19 J. OFFICIAL 
STAT. 133, 138 (2003). The empirical variance in cells with few respondents was estimated using the 
maximum sample variance in the remaining cells. Id. 
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Figure 1. Proportion of Respondents Finding Reasonable Expectations of 
Privacy Violated for Each of 18 Scenarios Split by Experimental Condition (with 
95% Confidence Intervals) 
A. Biases 
We performed a mixed logistic regression analysis to isolate how different 
variables affected outcomes in general. Our analysis found statistically 
significant evidence of both outcome bias and self-interest bias. Figure 1 plots 
the combined effect. Still, using regression models shown in Appendix C, we 
first examined the biases separately and focused on outcome bias. When 
participants were told that the police found incriminating evidence, the odds of 
finding that the conduct violated a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy 
were 2.44 times less than when they were simply told that the subject of the 
search was innocent (p < .0001). 
We can gain an intuitive understanding of this effect by analyzing the 
infrared photo scenario. In that scenario, we asked participants whether police 
taking infrared images of a house to determine whether some surfaces (walls and 
roof) are hotter than others violated reasonable expectations of privacy. In the 
third person/no evidence version of this scenario, we found that 62.7% of the 
population believed that such conduct violated reasonable expectations of 
privacy. When we told participants that evidence of crime was found, but the 













































































First Person, No Evidence of Crime(in black)
Third Person, Evidence of Crime(in red)
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expectations of privacy dropped from 62.7% to 40.8%.196 (This estimate is not 
shown in Figure 1, which blends across the two manipulations.) 
The results from our own study may underestimate hindsight bias in the 
real world. In our “outcome” condition, we merely told participants that the 
police found evidence that a person/they committed a crime. We did not state 
what the evidence or the crime was. Outcome bias is likely to exist upon a 
continuum. More powerful evidence (e.g., guns) or evidence of a more heinous 
crime (e.g., a brutal murder) probably enhances the effect.197 Thus, our 
experiment’s opaque outcome manipulation may understate the effect. 
We also found first person bias, replicating Slobogin and Schumacher’s 
findings.198 Additionally, our data provide some perspective on the degree of the 
effect first person bias has on decision making. When participants were asked 
questions about police conduct directed to another person (third party), they were 
1.43 times less likely to find that the police conduct violated a person’s 
reasonable expectations of privacy than when their own privacy interests were at 
issue (first person) (p < .0010). We can see how this effect played out in the 
roadblock scenario. When individuals were told that police conduct is directed 
at a third person instead of themselves, the absolute likelihood that a person will 
believe that conduct violates reasonable expectations of privacy dropped by 
6.4% to 20.5%, a relative decrease of 23.8%. 
As described earlier, judges typically decide cases with the knowledge of 
incriminating evidence and in the third person. Thus, in the real world, the 
question concerns the combined effect of these two biases. For example, in the 
DNA scenario, we asked whether it violated reasonable expectations of privacy 
for police to take DNA from a disposable coffee cup a person used at a police 
station. In the third person/evidence version, on average 33.1% of the population 
found that such conduct violated reasonable expectations of privacy. However, 
that number nearly doubled to 59.4% in the first person/no evidence version of 
that scenario. In other words, attitudes changed sufficiently so that activity that 
would not be categorized as a search under one frame (the one most courts 
actually use) would be categorized as a search in a different frame (the one courts 
say they should use). Of course, for this illustration, we chose the DNA scenario 
precisely because the two different versions were on opposite sides of the 50% 
threshold. These results suggest that the decision-making biases in the Fourth 
Amendment context are sufficiently significant that they may change the results 
 
 196. The odds ratio reflects how outcome bias impacted scenarios generally. Therefore, our 
calculation does not precisely match the numbers from Table 1, which reflect how the bias affected each 
individual scenario. 
 197.  See Segal & Woodson, supra note 126, at 23–24 (observing that judges are affected by the 
seriousness of the crime when making Fourth Amendment decisions for more intrusive searches); Avani 
Mehta Sood, Cognitive Cleansing: Experimental Psychology and the Exclusionary Rule, 103 GEO. L. J. 
1543, 1571–73 (2015) (finding that lay participants were more likely to find evidence admissible when 
the underlying crime was more egregious). 
 198. Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 7, at 759–61. 
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in close cases. Moreover, it is these close cases where judges are likely to be the 
most vulnerable to the unconscious biases that we identify here. To avoid these 
biases, we recommend that judges rely on surveys instead of their own intuitions 
to resolve these Fourth Amendment questions. 
B. By Scenario 
Table 2 shows the results for the first person, no outcome version of each 
scenario. The first column includes the wording of each scenario as given to the 
survey participants. The second column indicates what percentage of the survey 
participants answered “yes” to the question of whether the described actions 
would violate the participants’ reasonable expectations of privacy. The final 
column lists the mean “intrusiveness score” on a scale of 1 to 100, which the 
participants assigned the actions in each scenario. 
The table lists the scenarios according to the percentage of participants who 
ranked the actions as violating their reasonable expectations of privacy. Note that 
the ranking would have been very similar had the results been ordered by 
intrusiveness rating. As one would expect, for the most part the scenarios that 
more participants believed were a violation of their reasonable expectations of 
privacy were the same scenarios that received higher intrusiveness ratings. 
 
Table 2. Scenarios with Percent of Respondents Finding Violations of 
Reasonable Expectations of Privacy and Average Intrusiveness Rating (1-100 

























Roadblock - Police stopping you at a roadblock for fifteen seconds to 
ask you questions. 
27% 37 
Gunshot - Police using a system of GPS-enabled microphones in public 
locations to detect and locate the sound of gunshots. The system 
automatically stores sounds for two seconds before and four seconds 
after a gunshot. 
35% 50 
ID - Police stopping you on the street to ask you for identification. 49% 52 
DNA - Police obtaining your DNA from a disposable coffee cup you 




Infrared Photos - Police taking images of your house using an infrared 
device to determine whether some surfaces (walls and roof) of your 
house are hotter than others. 
70% 64 
Trunk - Police looking through the trunk of your car on a public street. 67% 66 
E Retail - Police obtaining, from online retailers, all of the goods and 
services you have bought online. 
75% 67 
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Google Maps - Police obtaining data from Google that reflects your 
precise location as you use Google Maps on your smartphone. 
76% 68 
Pat-down - Police stopping you on the street and patting down your 
outer clothing to feel for weapons. 
72% 68 
Web - Police obtaining data from a website operator that reflects the 
name, email address, telephone number, and physical address you 
entered when you opened an account on the website. 
74% 68 
Dropped Phone - Police finding your smartphone, which you dropped 
on a public sidewalk, and examining the pictures and videos stored on 
it. 
76% 71 
Track Phone - Police determining your smartphone’s movements for a 
period of seven months by obtaining, from a cellular provider, 
information from the cellphone towers. 
85% 73 
Bedroom – Police searching your bedroom. 86% 73 
Email - With help from your internet service provider, Police 
monitoring where and who you send emails to as well as how much 
data is sent, with help from your internet service provider. 
87% 74 
Stingray - Police using a device that pretends to be disguised as a cell 
phone tower to determine the location of your cell phone and record the 
content of any messages or calls made near the device. 
86% 77 
Drone - Police flying a drone equipped with a camera over your 
backyard at a height of sixty feet. 
85% 78 
Cloud - Police obtaining photos, documents, emails, and the names, 
addresses, and phone numbers of your contacts that you have stored in 
the Cloud. 
86% 78 
GPS - Police attaching a GPS to the bottom of your vehicle and tracking 
the vehicle for twenty-eight days. 
91% 80 
This ordinal ranking allows us to compare the views of the survey 
participants (reweighted to fit national demographics) with the views of the 
Supreme Court for those scenarios upon which the Supreme Court has 
specifically ruled. We included six scenarios that the Court has addressed 
precisely to allow for this comparison: police use of a roadblock;199 asking for 
identification;200 taking infrared images of a house;201 searching the trunk of a 
car;202 conducting a weapons pat-down;203 and searching a bedroom.204 In every 
case, the Supreme Court held that the police conduct did constitute a search or 
seizure. That is, in each of these six scenarios, the Court concluded that the police 
 
 199. See, e.g., City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000). 
 200. See, e.g., Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979). 
 201. See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
 202. See, e.g., Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970). 
 203. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
 204. See, e.g., Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). 
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conduct violated the subject’s reasonable expectations of privacy. That included 
the roadblock scenario, which our survey respondents considered the least 
intrusive upon privacy by a clear margin. In other words, if the Supreme Court 
treated even a roadblock as a violation of reasonable expectations of privacy, 
then a fortiori they should include every other scenario as a violation of 
reasonable expectations of privacy. To hold otherwise would be inconsistent 
with the societal expectations that the standard of reasonable expectations 
purports to reflect, at least according to our survey. 
The other scenarios we tested include uses of technology by the police—
such as tracking a person’s cell phone using information from the cell phone 
provider and police obtaining information stored in the Cloud—that the Supreme 
Court would not consider searches under the third party doctrine. The results of 
our study therefore provide compelling evidence that applying the third party 
doctrine to digital information, such as cell phone location information and 
information stored on the Cloud, would be inconsistent with society’s reasonable 
expectations of privacy. This finding—that individual expectations of privacy do 
not support the third party doctrine—reinforced the findings of previous recent 
studies and with a more robust and representative survey methodology. 
Moreover, we can make deeper comparisons between the Supreme Court’s 
views and those of our survey respondents. The Supreme Court does not treat all 
searches and seizures as equally intrusive upon privacy. Some searches and 
seizures are more intrusive upon reasonable expectations of privacy than others. 
Sometimes, the Court expressly has stated that one privacy intrusion is greater 
than another, such as searching a house versus searching an automobile.205 In 
other cases, we can deduce the relative degrees of intrusion by what the Court 
requires in order for each type of search to conform with the Fourth Amendment. 
The most intrusive searches and seizures—such as those involving entry into the 
home—must be supported by a warrant based on probable cause. But some 
classes of searches and seizures require less exacting justification, including (in 
descending order of exactitude) probable cause without a warrant; reasonable 
suspicion; and neutral guidelines without individualized suspicion. As we 
describe below, one of the factors (but not the only factor) that accounts for the 
kind of justification required to validate a search or seizure is the degree of 
privacy intrusion involved. We can therefore use the Court’s determinations 
about what is required to justify a search or seizure to create a rough ranking of 
the Supreme Court’s view about which searches and seizures are more intrusive 
than others. Then, we can see whether the Court’s rankings align with those of 
our survey respondents—something that none of the previous empirical studies 
have done. 
 
 205. See, e.g., United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 561 (1976) (“[O]ne’s expectation 
of privacy in an automobile and of freedom in its operation are significantly different from the traditional 
expectation of privacy and freedom in one’s residence.”). 
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We therefore outline below the Court’s analysis of the six search and 
seizure scenarios upon which it has ruled, described in descending order of the 
degree of intrusiveness the Court’s analysis has suggested. 
i. Police searching your bedroom. 
The Supreme Court has regularly reiterated that a person’s expectations of 
privacy are at their greatest with respect to physical intrusions into the person’s 
home. For example, the Court asserted in Payton v. New York206 that: “The 
Fourth Amendment protects the individual’s privacy in a variety of settings. In 
none is the zone of privacy more clearly defined than when bounded by the 
unambiguous physical dimensions of an individual’s home.”207 The preeminence 
of privacy within the home is grounded in both the text of the amendment (which 
expressly refers to the security of persons’ houses208) and the Court’s assertion 
that the “physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording 
of the Fourth Amendment is directed.”209 Hence, the Court treats “the sanctity of 
a [person’s] home”210 as “the archetype of the privacy protection secured by the 
Fourth Amendment,”211 and a warrant based on probable cause is required for 
both searches and seizures inside a home.212 
ii. Police taking images of your house using an infrared device 
The Court held in Kyllo v. United States213 that “the use of a thermal-
imaging device aimed at a private home from a public street to detect relative 
amounts of heat within the home constitutes a ‘search’ within the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment.”214 The Court explained that the Government violates the 
residents’ reasonable expectations of privacy when it “uses a device that is not 
in general public use, to explore details of the home that would previously have 
 
 206. 445 U.S. 573 (1980) (declaring that a New York statute permitting warrantless entry into a 
home with probable cause to arrest violated the Fourth Amendment). 
 207. Id. at 589. 
 208. See, e.g., id. at 589–90 (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961)) 
(“That language unequivocally establishes the proposition that ‘at the very core of the Fourth 
Amendment stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable 
governmental intrusion.’”). 
 209. Id. at 585 (quoting United States v. U.S. District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972)). 
 210. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886). 
 211. Payton, 445 U.S. at 587 (quoting Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d 385, 389 (1970)); see 
also Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (describing the interior of homes as “the prototypical 
and hence most commonly litigated area of protected privacy”); City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 
U.S. 32, 54 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (stating that “a person’s body and home [are the] areas 
afforded the greatest Fourth Amendment protection”); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 515 (1983) 
(describing a “private residence” as the place “where reasonable expectations of privacy perhaps are at 
their greatest”). 
 212. Payton, 445 U.S. at 586 (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 477–478 
(1971)) (asserting that “[i]t is a ‘basic principle of Fourth Amendment law’ that searches and seizures 
inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable”). 
 213. 533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
 214. Id. at 29. 
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been unknowable without physical intrusion.”215 Such a search is treated on the 
same footing as a physical intrusion216 and therefore is also “presumptively 
unreasonable without a warrant”217 supported by probable cause. 
iii. Police looking through the trunk of your car on a public street 
The Court has repeatedly held that searching the interior of a vehicle 
(including the trunk) is a search that requires probable cause, but that in general 
does not require a warrant.218 The Court recognized that exigent circumstances 
apply because “the car is movable, the occupants are alerted, and the car’s 
contents may never be found again if a warrant must be obtained.”219 More 
fundamentally, the Court also based its holding—that a vehicle search is 
reasonable with probable cause but “without the extra protection for privacy that 
a warrant affords”220—on its belief that people have a “lesser expectation of 
privacy in a motor vehicle.”221 Similarly, the Court in United States v. Martinez-
Fuerte222 stated that “[o]ne’s expectation of privacy in an automobile and of 
freedom in its operation are significantly different from the traditional 
expectation of privacy and freedom in one’s residence.”223 
iv. Police stopping you on the street and patting down your other clothing to 
feel for weapons 
The Supreme Court addressed the constitutional status of “stop and frisks” 
in the seminal case of Terry v. Ohio.224 In Terry, the Court held that a stop and 
frisk in public was both a search and a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. The 
Court declared: 
It must be recognized that whenever a police officer accosts an 
individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has “seized” that 
person. And it is nothing less than sheer torture of the English language 
to suggest that a careful exploration of the outer surfaces of a person’s 
 
 215. Id. at 40. 
 216. See, e.g., id. at 37 (“The Fourth Amendment’s protection of the home has never been tied to 
measurement of the quality or quantity of information obtained.”); id. at 40 (quoting Payton, 445 U.S. 
at 590) (citation omitted) (“We have said that the Fourth Amendment draws ‘a firm line at the entrance 
to the house.’ That line, we think, must be not only firm but also bright—which requires clear 
specification of those methods of surveillance that require a warrant.”). 
 217. Id. 
 218. See, e.g., California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 580 (1991) (“The police may search an 
automobile and the containers within it where they have probable cause to believe contraband or 
evidence is contained.”); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 
132 (1925). 
 219. Chambers, 399 U.S. at 51. 
 220. Id. at 50. 
 221. Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974). 
 222. 428 U.S. 543 (1976). 
 223. Id. at 561; see also City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 55 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., 
dissenting) (referring to “[t]he lowered expectation[s] of privacy in one’s automobile”). 
 224. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
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clothing all over his or her body in an attempt to find weapons is not a 
“search.” 225 
In other words, a stop and frisk intrudes upon reasonable expectations of 
privacy, dignity,226 and freedom of movement. However, the Court also stated 
that because the intrusiveness of a stop and frisk was less than that of “a 
‘technical arrest’ or a ‘full-blown search,’”227 a warrant based on probable cause 
was not required.228 Instead, the Court balanced the government interest in 
conducting the search and seizure against the “constitutionally protected 
interests of the private citizen,”229 with “the scope of the particular intrusion . . . 
a central element in the analysis of reasonableness.”230 Since a stop and frisk 
“may realistically be characterized as something less than a ‘full’ search, even 
though it remains a serious intrusion,”231 the Court concluded that reasonable 
suspicion (a lesser standard than probable cause) was the appropriate standard 
for justifying the police conduct.232 That is, a stop and frisk is permitted under 
the Fourth Amendment “[w]hen an officer is justified in believing that the 
individual whose suspicious behavior he is investigating at close range is armed 
and presently dangerous to the officer or to others.”233 
v. Police stopping you on the street to ask you for identification 
A police officer stopping someone on the street to ask for identification is 
a temporary seizure under the Fourth Amendment. Terry established that a stop 
on a public street requires reasonable suspicion. In Brown v. Texas,234 the 
Supreme Court held specifically that such a stop accompanied by a demand for 
identification was an unreasonable seizure because the officers involved lacked 
“reasonable suspicion, based on objective facts, that the individual [was] 
involved in criminal activity.”235 
 
 225. Id. at 16. 
 226. Id. at 17 (stating that a stop and frisk “is a serious intrusion upon the sanctity of the person, 
which may inflict great indignity and arouse strong resentment”). 
 227. Id. at 19. 
 228. Id. at 20 (“[W]e deal here with an entire rubric of police conduct—necessarily swift action 
predicated upon the on-the-spot observations of the officer on the beat—which historically has not been, 
and as a practical matter could not be, subjected to the warrant procedure.”). 
 229. Id. at 21. 
 230. Id. at 19 n.15. 
 231. Id. at 26. 
 232. The Terry Court describes the reasonable suspicion standard in the following terms: 
“The officer need not be absolutely certain that the individual is armed; the issue is whether a reasonably 
prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was 
in danger.” Id. at 27. The Court also made clear that the reasonable suspicion standard may be met “even 
though there is no probable cause to make an arrest.” Id. at 22. 
 233. Id. at 24. 
 234. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979). 
 235. Id. at 51. 
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vi. Police stopping you at a roadblock for fifteen seconds to ask you questions 
A roadblock constitutes a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. That is, a 
reasonable person subjected to such a roadblock would not feel free to leave. As 
a seizure, the roadblock and detention must be reasonable, but what constitutes 
reasonableness depends on the purpose of the temporary detention. If a 
roadblock is set up in an emergency situation— for example, “to thwart an 
imminent terrorist attack or to catch a dangerous criminal who is likely to flee 
by way of a particular route”236—then “the Fourth Amendment would almost 
certainly permit [it].”237 In the absence of such exigent circumstances, however, 
a roadblock for ordinary law enforcement purposes—such as attempting to 
intercept narcotics traffickers—“can only be justified by some quantum of 
individualized suspicion.”238 That quantum of individualized suspicion is 
reasonable suspicion.239 
However, if the roadblock is set up for a purpose other than the ordinary 
needs of law enforcement, such as to ensure road safety240 or to detect 
undocumented immigrants,241 then even individualized (i.e., reasonable) 
suspicion is not required. Instead, “where a Fourth Amendment intrusion serves 
special governmental needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, it is 
necessary to balance the individual’s privacy expectations against the 
Government’s interests.”242 This standard is met by, for example, a fixed 
immigration checkpoint roughly in the vicinity of the nation’s border243 and a 
sobriety checkpoint at which officers do not have discretion about which 
motorists to stop.244 In each of these decisions, the Supreme Court justified 
allowing suspicion-less stops on the basis, inter alia, that “the measure of the 
intrusion on motorists stopped briefly at sobriety checkpoints . . . is slight.”245 
 
Table 3. Summary of Supreme Court Doctrinal Requirements for Justifying 
a Valid Search 
 
Scenario 
Supreme Court Requirement for Valid 
Search 
Roadblock 
Neutral guidelines/criteria  
(individualized suspicion not required) 
 
 236. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 44 (2000). 
 237. Id. 
 238. Id. at 47. 
 239. See Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972). 
 240. See, e.g., Michigan Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990). 
 241. See, e.g., United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976). 
 242. Sitz, 496 U.S. at 449. 
 243. See, e.g., Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 543. 
 244. See, e.g., Sitz, 496 U.S. at 453. 
 245. Id. at 451. 
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Search trunk of car 
Probable cause  
(warrant not required) 
Infrared images of house 
Probable cause and a warrant 
Search of bedroom 
The survey results for many of the individual scenarios conflict with the 
Supreme Court’s historical judgments on the same police conduct. This disparity 
is apparent when comparing the Supreme Court’s determinations of the 
scenarios’ relative intrusiveness with our study’s determinations of the same 
scenarios’ relative intrusiveness. 
First, the survey participants consider a pat-down for weapons on a public 
street to be more intrusive than a search of the trunk of a car on a public street.246 
This runs counter to the Supreme Court’s approach. As described in Table 3, a 
trunk search requires probable cause,247 whereas a pat-down for weapons 
requires only reasonable suspicion. This is likely due to the greater privacy 
intrusion (according to the Court) when searching a car trunk than when 
conducting a weapons pat-down.248 The results of earlier surveys accord with the 
Court’s approach rather than with the results of our survey. In earlier surveys, 
respondents viewed the search of a trunk to be a greater privacy intrusion than a 
pat-down for weapons.249 
Second, the data shows that the survey participants consider many of the 
“technology” searches to be more intrusive than other actions that the Supreme 
Court has not only held to violate reasonable expectations of privacy, but has 
held to involve the greatest violation of reasonable expectations of privacy. This 
can be seen from Table 4 below, which combines the survey results in Table 2 
with the Supreme Court’s rankings in Table 3. Table 4 also shows whether a 
lower court (for scenarios upon which the Supreme Court has not yet ruled) has 
held that the described action violates a reasonable expectation of privacy and, 
if so, what degree of justification the investigators required in order for the search 






 246. See supra Table 1. 
 247. California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 580 (1991) (“The police may search an automobile 
and the containers within it where they have probable cause to believe contraband or evidence is 
contained.”). 
 248. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1967) (requiring reasonable suspicion of criminal activity 
and possession of a weapon). 
 249. See, e.g., Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 7, at 738. 
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Table 4. Comparison of Respondent Perceptions and Supreme Court 
Requirements by Experimental Scenario 
 
 
 250. Compare United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772, 780 (6th Cir. 2012) (holding that tracking 
a criminal suspect for three days using cell tower information did not constitute a search), United States 
v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498 (11th Cir. 2015), and United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880 (6th Cir. 2016) 
(holding that obtaining cellular location information did not constitute a search), with United States v. 
Graham, 796 F. 3d 332 (4th Cir. 2015) (finding that collecting two weeks of cellular location information 
constituted a search). 
 251. United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d. 500, 504 (2008) (“[C]omputer surveillance that enabled 
the government to learn the to/from addresses of his e mail messages . . . did not constitute a search. . . .”). 
 252. United States v. Lambis, 197 F. Supp. 3d 606, 611 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (“The use of a cell-site 
simulator constitutes a . . . search . . . . Absent a search warrant, the Government may not turn a citizen’s 
cell phone into a tracking device.”). 
 253. But see United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 530 (2015) (Rosenbaum, J., concurring) (“As 
for documents that we store in the Cloud, our privacy interest there is the same as that recognized in 








in judicial holding? 
Requirements/justification 
for valid search 
Roadblock 36.7 Yes Neutral criteria/guidelines 
Gunshot detection 49.9 ? Not yet determined 
Street stop for ID 51.7 Yes Reasonable suspicion 
DNA – coffee cup 55.4 No No REP, so no justification  
Infrared images  63.4 Yes Probable cause and warrant 
Trunk of car 65.7 Yes Probable cause 
E-retail 
information 
67.3 ? Suggested by Justice 
Sotomayor 
Google maps 68.0 ? Suggested by Justice 
Sotomayor 
Pat-down 68.1 Yes Reasonable suspicion 
Web site operator 68.1 No No REP, so no justification  
Dropped phone  70.5 No No REP, so no justification  
Track Phone 72.9 ? Circuit split250 
Bedroom search 73.1 Yes Probable cause and warrant 
Email recipients  73.8 No No REP, according to 




77.0 ? Probable cause and 
warrant, according to 
District Court252 
Drone – backyard 77.5 ? Not yet determined  
Cloud 77.6 ? Not yet determined253 
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As we noted above, even the action with the lowest intrusiveness rating—
brief questioning at a roadblock—intrudes upon a person’s reasonable 
expectations of privacy, according to Supreme Court precedent.255 In other 
words, survey participants consider every one of the “technology searches” to be 
more intrusive of privacy than actions that the Court has held does violate 
reasonable expectations of privacy. Similarly, survey participants consider all 
but one of the technology searches (gunshot detection) to be more intrusive than 
being stopped on the street and asked for identification, which the Court has held 
is a temporary seizure that requires reasonable suspicion. 
This comparison of the survey results also provides further support for the 
contention—made by Justice Sotomayor in United States v. Jones and by 
numerous scholars—that the Court should not apply the third party doctrine to 
technology searches. Two of the questions in the survey were based on scenarios 
that Justice Sotomayor pointed out are not violations of reasonable expectations 
of privacy at all under the third party doctrine. However, in our study, survey 
participants consider these two scenarios—police obtaining information about 
your online retail purchases and police obtaining your location information from 
Google Maps—to be more intrusive than full-blown searches requiring probable 
cause (and, in one case, a warrant). 
Additionally, survey participants consider tracking a person’s movements 
by using cellular towers to be more intrusive than a physical pat-down, which 
the Supreme Court has classified as a search. The former issue is currently 
pending before the Supreme Court in Carpenter v. United States.256 Our data also 
suggest that ordinary people view the police’s conduct in this case as violating 
their reasonable expectations of privacy, suggesting that it should be classified 
as a search. 
Finally, survey participants consider five of the technology searches to be 
the most intrusive of all the study’s scenarios. All five of these—Stingray 
 
As discussed previously, the Supreme Court has plainly recognized as reasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment the privacy interest in effects held in such places . . . The privacy expectation has not 
abraded simply because the effect to be searched is virtual and the ‘place’ of storage is now the intangible 
Cloud.”). 
 254. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 412–13 (2012) (“We may have to grapple with these 
‘vexing problems’ [about when GPS tracking violates reasonable expectations of privacy] in some future 
case where a classic trespassory search is not involved and resort must be had to Katz analysis; but there 
is no reason for rushing forward to resolve them here.”). But see United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 
544 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (holding that installation and monitoring of a GPS device constitutes a search); 
Tracey v. State, 152 So. 3d 504 (Fla. 2014) (holding that real-time tracking of a suspect using her cell 
phone on public roads constitutes a search). 
 255. See Michigan Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990). 
 256. United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880 (6th Cir. 2016), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 2211 
(June 5, 2017) (No. 16-402). 
GPS - track 
vehicle 
79.5 ? Not decided in U.S. v. 
Jones254  
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devices, drones, obtaining emails, accessing the Cloud, and GPS tracking—were 
considered more intrusive than a police search of one’s bedroom, the 
quintessential violation of privacy that requires justification by probable cause 
and a warrant. Given the Court’s assertions that the definition of a search reflects 
what society considers to be an intrusion into reasonable expectations of privacy, 
these five investigative actions should be held to be searches requiring the 
presence of probable cause and a search warrant. Interestingly, according to the 
data, the most intrusive search of all the scenarios presented was tracking a 
vehicle using a GPS device—which is precisely the question the Supreme Court 
declined to decide in United States v. Jones. 
C. Other Significant Factors 
This part discusses race, experience with law enforcement, political 
leanings, age, income, and sex as predictors for whether individuals will find 
privacy violations. To the extent that the judiciary suffers from these same 
demographic associations and is not demographically representative of the 
population, these data explain why doctrine may evolve away from the public’s 
reasonable expectations of privacy. 
1. Race and Experience with Law Enforcement 
Using a regression analysis, we analyzed whether participants’ responses 
differed based on race. Our primary finding was that those who identified as 
White were less sensitive to police conduct than those who identified as African 
American. On average, Whites found that 10.7 out of 18 scenarios violated 
reasonable expectations of privacy.257 African Americans found violations 
12.3% more often, or an average of 2.21 additional scenarios in the slate of 18 
(p < .001). Compared to Whites, individuals that identified as “other” race were 
13.2% more likely to find a violation (2.38 additional scenarios on average) (p < 
.001). 
The prior literature suggested that Hispanics’ privacy attitudes might also 
differ from Whites’, but we did not see such differences in our results, even 
though we had strong statistical power to detect even small effects.258 No other 
minorities (American Indians/Alaskan Natives, Asian/Native Hawaiians, or 
Other Pacific Islanders) showed statistically significant differences. 
Additionally, we found interesting differences with the way experience 
with law enforcement affected Whites and African Americans. Whites who had 
been the subject of a police search were more sensitive to police conduct.259 But 
 
 257. See Race/Experience Model found in Appendix C. 
 258. In one context, others have reported that Hispanics were “over three times more likely to 
believe that a warrant was necessary.” Smith et al., supra note 180, at 137 (for tracking cell phone use 
information). 
 259. We asked participants to check a box if the following statement applied to them: “The police 
have NEVER searched me or my property.” In our study, 202 out of 770 White respondents (26.2%) 
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the same effect was not seen in African Americans. Specifically, Whites who 
said that they had been the subject of a police search found privacy violations 
9.2% more often (1.65 additional scenarios on average) than White respondents 
who did not have this experience (p < .001), controlling for all other covariates. 
In contrast, African Americans who had been the subject of a police search in 
the past were not more sensitive to privacy violations than African American 
respondents who did not have such an experience. If anything, the data trended 
slightly in the opposite direction.260 
We also asked participants whether they or their close friends or family 
members had been the subject of a police investigation. The results were similar. 
When participants or their close friends or family members had been the subject 
of a criminal investigation, White respondents found 9.26% (1.67 scenarios) 
more violations of privacy than Whites without any of these experiences (p < 
.001).261 Not surprisingly, the effect was more pronounced when we focused on 
Whites who had been personally the subject of a criminal investigation. They 
found 12.5% more scenarios (2.26 scenarios) to violate reasonable expectations 
of privacy (p < .001).262 But again, for both these analyses, we did not see similar 
results with African Americans. Indeed, our results trended in the opposite 
direction, but they were not statistically significant. 
These results suggest that one factor affecting privacy views of police 
conduct is past experiences with police. But race complicates the story. For 
Whites, such individual experiences appear to make them more concerned about 
privacy. However, African Americans are already more concerned about police 
conduct than their White counterparts. These attitudes may be because the 
African American community as a whole has different views of police than 
Whites do. It may be that, perhaps because of the higher rate of pat-downs, 
arrests, and prison time for African Americans—and the sense that these 
experiences with the criminal justice system are in significant part because of 
their race—the attitudes resulting from police interaction are promulgated 
throughout African American communities.263 That is, it may be that, regardless 
of whether African Americans or their friends or family have had direct 
experiences with the police, they generally (and understandably) have attitudes 
 
and 49 out of 207 African American respondents (23.6%) did not check a box (i.e., they have been 
searched). 
 260. In other words, African Americans who had personal experiences with police searches were 
actually less likely to find that certain scenarios violated reasonable expectations of privacy. Our 
regression analysis found that African Americans who had been searched found that the scenarios 
violated reasonable expectations of privacy 5.91% less often (1.06 fewer scenarios). But these findings 
were not statistically significant (p = .124). 
 261. Here, 167 out of 770 White respondents (21.7%) and 62 out of 207 African American 
respondents (30.0%) reported that they, a close friend, or family member had been the subject of a 
criminal investigation within the last ten years. 
 262. We found that 79 White respodents out of 770 (10.3%) and 17 African Americans out of 
207 (8.21%) had been the subject of a criminal investigation in the last ten years. 
 263. See supra notes 143–47 discussion and sources. 
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towards the police akin to that of White individuals who have had direct 
experiences with the police. While our data is certainly consistent with this 
hypothesis, our study cannot explain why experiences with police affect the 
privacy views of Whites and African Americans in different ways. 
2. Political Leanings 
Our analysis of political leanings showed that individuals who prefer 
Republicans are less likely to find violations of reasonable expectations of 
privacy. We asked participants to place themselves on a seven-tiered scale. One 
end was “I strongly prefer the Democrats,” and the other end was “I strongly 
prefer the Republicans.” For every step in the conservative direction, participants 
found 1.90% (0.34 out of 18 scenarios) fewer violations of reasonable 
expectations of privacy (p < .0001). This result suggests that individuals who 
strongly prefer Republicans will find that 11.4% less scenarios violate reasonable 
expectations of privacy than those who strongly prefer Democrats. 
These findings are consistent with those of Fradella et al. and Smith et al. 
Fradella found that “Republicans express lower levels of support for the 
protection of privacy than Democrats.”264 More narrowly, Smith found that 
Democrats were more likely to expect privacy for cell phone data.265 Conversely, 
Kugler and Strahilevitz did not find that political orientation affected people’s 
view on GPS surveillance, while Scott-Hayward et al. found that independents 
had higher expectations of privacy for location information than either 
Republicans or Democrats. 266 
3. Age 
We found that an individual’s age also had some ability to explain a 
person’s privacy views. A standard linear regression failed to yield statistically 
significant results. However, modeling age using a quadratic function (i.e., 
similar to a parabola) was consistent with the results of our survey (p < .05).267 
This model predicts that participants at the middle of our age range will find 
more violations of privacy than both younger and older people. 
Figure 2 depicts our age model and gives an intuitive sense of these 
findings. The model predicts that people at forty-one years old find the most 
violations of privacy; they found that 65.6% more scenarios violated reasonable 
expectations of privacy (11.8 out of 18 scenarios). However, both younger and 
older people were less concerned about privacy. Our model predicts that our 
 
 264. Fradella et al., supra note 173, at 368. 
 265. Smith et al., supra note 180, at 138. 
 266. Kugler & Strahilevitz, supra note 25, at 255; Scott-Hayward et al., supra note 176, at 58. 
 267. See Appendix C, Table C2 Age Model. At first, we tried modeling age using a linear 
function. Examination of a residual plot from that model suggested that expectations of privacy were 
higher for those in the middle age range. Accordingly, we used a quadratic function to model the data 
and that was a better fit. 
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youngest population will find a very small reduction in the number of scenarios 
that violate reasonable expectations privacy. Individuals eighteen years of age 
are predicted to find that 4.5% fewer scenarios (.81 out of 18 scenarios) violate 
reasonable expectations of privacy. However, our model shows slightly larger 
effects as people age. For example, seventy-year-olds are predicted to find that 
7.2% (1.3 out of 18 scenarios) fewer scenarios violate reasonable expectations 
of privacy.268 
Figure 2. Average Number of Scenarios Found to Violate Reasonable 
Expectations of Privacy as a Quadratic Function of Age 
 
Kugler and Strahilevitz also found modest age affects. They noted that 
those with the lowest privacy expectations in the geolocation context were 
significantly older than other groups (6.42 years older).269 It is unclear whether 
we can reconcile these different studies using a parabolic model like the one we 
use above. 
As a point of reference, consider that fifty is the average age at which U.S. 
federal magistrate judges are appointed.270 These judges are often tasked with 
resolving procedural questions, including motions to suppress evidence in 
 
 268. The sparseness of the points in the higher age range reflects the absence of participants in 
certain ages. 
 269. Kugler & Strahilevitz, supra note 25, at 252. 
 270. See Appointments of Magistrate Judges—Judicial Business 2012, U.S. COURTS, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/appointments-magistrate-judges-judicial-business-2012 
[https://perma.cc/3FER-5PTB]. 
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criminal cases. Most states have mandatory retirement ages.271 Federal judges, 
of course, have life tenure and other incentives to continue on the bench in 
“senior status,” which skews the judiciary’s age upwards.272 It is thus 
unsurprising that judicial doctrine skews away from the perceptions of a younger 
population. 
4. Income 
We also found that an individual’s income had some ability to explain a 
person’s privacy views. Again, a standard linear regression failed to yield 
statistically significant results. However, modeling income using a quadratic 
function was more consistent with our survey results (p < .05).273 This model 
predicts that participants at the middle-income range will find fewer violations 
of privacy than both poorer and wealthier people. 
Figure 3. Average Number of Scenarios Found to Violate Reasonable 
Expectation of Privacy as a Quadratic Function of Income 
 
 271. See Arizona Proposition 115: What Courts/States Have Mandatory Judicial Retirement and 
at What Age?, GAVEL TO GAVEL (Feb. 12, 2013), http://gaveltogavel.us/2012/10/11/arizona-
proposition-115-what-courtsstates-have-mandatory-judicial-retirement-and-at-what-age 
[https://perma.cc/84NG-432M] (noting that thirty-two states and the District of Columbia have age 
limits for at least some of their judges). 
 272. See generally Life Tenure for Federal Judges Raises Issues of Senility, Dementia, PRO 
PUBLICA (Jan. 11, 2012, 7:30 AM), https://www.propublica.org/article/life-tenure-for-federal-judges-
raises-issues-of-senility-dementia [https://perma.cc/VU4T-NW84]. 
 273. See Appendix C, Table C2 Income Model. 
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Figure 3 depicts our income model. Our model predicts that people with 
incomes between $60,000 and $89,999 will consider 11.2 of our 18 scenarios 
(62.2%) to violate reasonable expectations of privacy. However, as income 
diminishes to less than $10,000 (zero on our income scale), our model suggests 
that such individuals will find 7.2% (1.3 out of 18 scenarios) more of our 
scenarios to violate reasonable expectations or privacy. To a lesser extent, the 
same is true for individuals who are higher on the income ladder. Figure 3 shows 
that our model predicts that individuals that earn over $200,000 (12 on our 
income scale) will find 3.9% more scenarios (.7 out of 18 scenarios) violate their 
expectations of privacy. 
Smith et al. found that lower income respondents were more likely to 
believe that an individual had an expectation of privacy in relation to data stored 
on their cell phones.274 It is unclear whether these results are consistent with our 
parabolic model. 
5. Sex 
Men were generally more likely to find privacy violations than women, in 
a substantial effect with size comparable to that of being African American or 
viewing the case in the first person perspective.275 We also examined gender 
interactions with every individual scenario, and identified one contrary scenario 
– the body pat-down – in which women were more likely to find privacy 
violations.276 As noted above, women tend to be underrepresented in the state 
and federal judiciary.277 Thus, if judges also suffer from these sex-associated 
attitudes, doctrine may be biased towards privacy generally but against privacy 
findings in body pat-down situations. 
V. 
LIMITATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. Limitations 
Our study had several methodological limitations. Before reviewing those, 
it is important to acknowledge our conceptual focus on the threshold question of 
whether police conduct constitutes a search or seizure. Our study does not 
directly address the question of whether a search or seizure is ultimately 
reasonable, a distinct question under Supreme Court doctrine (even though it also 
turns on a conception of reasonableness). 
 
 274. Smith et al., supra note 180, at 138. 
 275. See Appendix C, Table C1 (showing that the odds of men finding privacy violations were 
1.474 times that of women (p = 0.0008), compared to African Americans (1.639) or those in First Person 
condition (1.429)). 
 276. See id. (showing odds of 1.729 (p =0.0004)). 
 277. See supra notes 147–149 discussion. 
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First, we used short and very abridged statements for our experimental 
stimulus, providing respondents with less contextual information than judges 
have when they decide analogous questions in a litigated case. The condensed 
stimulus allowed us to utilize a randomized, controlled, and experimental design, 
which is the gold standard for scientific research, and allowed us to study a wide 
range of scenarios. These focused vignettes also allowed us to avoid other 
extraneous and potentially biasing information (e.g., the suspect’s race or the 
particular crime under investigation), which could confound our results. 
Nonetheless, it is possible that respondents would have different views about the 
scenarios and the biases we observed could have different magnitudes, if we 
introduced additional information. Because we did not specify these other 
variables, respondents may have made their own assumptions, which we do not 
observe. 
Second, we did not study the actual judges who make judicial decisions. 
For the purposes of determining whether these police practices do violate 
reasonable expectations of privacy, we argued in Section II.Dabove that the legal 
doctrine actually requires such an inquiry into the perceptions of ordinary 
Americans. However, we also use our data to critique current judicial practice. 
Our data show that cognitive bias infects privacy assessments when decided from 
hindsight and from the third-person perspectives which judges presently employ. 
It would take an inferential step from the biases documented in our sample to the 
population of judges for this to suggest a problem in our current judicial practice. 
Prior work with actual judges makes this inference quite reasonable.278 It is 
possible, nonetheless, that judges are not subject to the same cognitive biases as 
other humans are.279 
Third, although we took care to recruit a sample that represented certain 
U.S. demographic profiles based on the U.S. Census and further reweighted the 
sample to approximate the U.S. population, we did not use a true probability 
sample (such as random digit dialing). In particular, it is likely that our online 
sample includes more active Internet users than the U.S. population at large, and 
this may affect their perceptions of police practices involving technology. 
Fourth, although we can infer causation from our randomly-assigned 
variables (hindsight and third person biases), which hold constant all observable 
and non-observable differences, we can only speak in terms of association for 
the naturally-occurring variables (such as respondent demographics). For the 
latter associations that we observe, we use multivariate regressions to adjust for 
other observed covariates, but we cannot rule out the possibility that non-
observed variables cause these associations. For example, although we see 
females are more privacy protective in the domain of body pat-downs, it may be 
that victims of sexual assault are more sensitive, and this non-observed 
 
 278. See supra notes 114, 117. 
 279. See supra notes 118–30 and accompanying text. 
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characteristic is more common among females. This is a standard limitation of 
cross-sectional research. 
B. Policy Recommendations 
We have five primary findings relevant to policy. First and most 
importantly, generally members of the U.S. public have greater concerns for 
privacy than are reflected in current judicial doctrine. Second, current judicial 
doctrine includes several relative judgments—e.g., giving no protection to 
emails held by an internet provider, but the strongest available Fourth 
Amendment protection to a bedroom—that do not reflect actual expectations of 
privacy in the United States. Third, the ubiquitous practice of judgment in 
hindsight (i.e., with knowledge that the search has found evidence of crime) 
strongly decreases the likelihood that participants would find violations of 
reasonable expectations of privacy. Fourth, the ubiquitous practice of developing 
Fourth Amendment doctrine by resolving criminal defendants’ suppression 
motions (in the third person) also decreases the likelihood of finding a violation. 
Fifth, Whites and older persons (beyond age forty-one)—i.e., those who 
dominate the judiciary—are less likely to find that police investigative practices 
invade privacy. 
In principle, the five distinct findings could yield as many, or more, policy 
reform recommendations. For example, first, to address our race findings, we 
recommend reform of the judiciary so that the population of judges deciding 
Fourth Amendment questions might reflect the demographics of the U.S. 
population at large (if not the population of those most often subject to police 
investigations). Especially in state courts, judges are currently disproportionately 
White, which means that they are likely biased against finding police privacy 
violations, compared to the perceptions of the broader U.S. population. On the 
other hand, states are ahead of the federal judiciary in imposing mandatory 
retirement ages, which should mitigate the age-related biases that we document. 
Second, to address the conflict between current judicial doctrine and the actual 
expectations of privacy held by ordinary citizens, we recommend that the 
Supreme Court should hold that the third party doctrine does not apply to 
searches involving digital technology.280 
 
 280. The Supreme Court is grappling with this very issue now in Carpenter v. United States. See 
supra note 256 and accompanying text. Moreover, two district courts reached different conclusions 
about whether the third party doctrine allows the National Security Agency to make a daily warrantless 
sweep of the public’s metadata pursuant to an earlier incarnation of the Foreign Intelligence and 
Surveillance Act. Compare Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2013) (finding government 
collection of telephony metadata constitutes a search), vacated on other grounds, 800 F.3d 559 (D.C. 
Cir. 2015), with ACLU v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724 (S.D.N.Y 2013) (finding government collection 
of telephony metadata does not constitute a search because the third party doctrine applies), rev’d on 
other grounds, 785 F.3d 787 (2d Cir. 2015). The courts could also use the same kind of data for other 
issues that they are facing now. For example, applying the private search doctrine to different types of 
digital information has produced inconsistent results. There is currently a circuit split as to the proper 
application of the doctrine to computers and digital storage devices. See, e.g., United States v. Ackerman, 
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More generally, we recommend a solution for all five problems. If courts 
would rely on properly-constructed surveys to assess whether particular conduct 
violates reasonable expectations of privacy, then they could avoid the difficulties 
of speculating from their own racialized perspective in hindsight and in the third 
person. When the survey stimulus materials are properly constructed, this 
proposal has the benefit of eliminating both hindsight bias and third person bias. 
If the sample is constructed (or reweighted) to reflect the demographics of the 
U.S. population, then race and age biases can be resolved as well. Finally, this 
approach substitutes reliable evidence for judicial speculation, aligning judicial 
doctrine about privacy with the actual views of the public that is to be governed 
by that doctrine.281 It is worth emphasizing that judicial use of reliable empirical 
evidence does not involve a departure from the current doctrinal approach, and 
therefore it requires no additional normative justification. As we described in 
detail in Section I.D, the courts already peg the definitions of searches and 
seizures to ordinary beliefs; they just do so while relying on their personal 
speculation and intuitions about what those ordinary beliefs are, instead of 
accurate and reliable empirical data.282 On the other hand, science is no 
panacea—it must be done well, be free of bias, and be interpreted properly.283 
 
831 F.3d 1292, 1306–07 (10th Cir. 2016) (finding government investigators conducted an illegal search 
when they opened files not previously viewed by a third party); United States v. Lichtenberger, 786 F.3d 
478, 491 (6th Cir. 2015) (finding police conducted an illegal search when they viewed files on a device 
in addition to the files previously viewed by a private party); United States v. Sparks, 806 F.3d 1323, 
1335 (11th Cir. 2015) (finding police conducted an illegal search when they viewed images and videos 
on a storage device in addition to the files on the device that were previously viewed by a third party); 
Rann v. Atchison, 689 F.3d 832, 838 (7th Cir. 2012) (finding police did not conduct a search when a 
private party had viewed some files on a zip drive, even though the police opened and viewed additional 
files on the zip drive that the private party had not viewed); United States v. Runyan, 275 F.3d 449, 464 
(5th Cir. 2001) (holding that police did not conduct a search when a private party had viewed some files 
on CDs, even though the police opened and viewed additional files on the CDs that private party had 
not viewed). 
 281. In principle, aligning judicial doctrine with actual views of privacy could involve either 
increasing Fourth Amendment protections, where actual views of privacy are stronger than the Supreme 
Court’s historical judgments, or decreasing Fourth Amendment protections, where actual views of 
privacy are weaker than the Court’s judgments. However, at least with respect to the scenarios we tested, 
the results indicated that actual views of privacy were either stronger than, or consistent with, the Court’s 
doctrinal judgments. Even the scenario that had the lowest intrusiveness responses among those we 
tested—the police roadblock—was considered a privacy intrusion by more than one-quarter of the 
survey respondents. See supra Section IV.B. This is consistent with the Supreme Court’s holding that a 
police roadblock is a Fourth Amendment seizure, but one involving a relatively minor intrusion on the 
motorist and consequently requiring a relatively minor justification. Michigan Dep’t of State Police v. 
Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990) (holding that sobriety checkpoints intrude upon a motorists’ privacy, but are 
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment even in the absence of individualized suspicion provided that 
they are administered according to non-discretionary procedures). 
 282. It is also worth noting that, in utilizing empirical data on reasonable expectations of privacy, 
the courts are not ceding their ultimate judgment on whether law enforcement practices violate the 
Fourth Amendment. The courts would still, inter alia, decide whether or not law enforcement practices 
considered intrusive by ordinary citizens are reasonable and therefore permissible under the Fourth 
Amendment. 
 283. See generally FED. JUDICIAL CTR., REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE (3d ed. 
2011) (guiding judges on how to interpret scientific evidence and survey data in particular); Christopher 
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CONCLUSION 
Our experiment replicated some of the best features from prior work and 
improved on them in several ways. First, we started with a large (1,200 
participants) and demographically diverse sample. Instead of drawing 
participants to mirror the U.S. population, we intentionally oversampled 
minorities, which allowed statistically reliable estimates for their distinctive 
perceptions of privacy. This is important because police investigations tend to 
fall disproportionately on these populations. Nonetheless, we also reweighted 
our sample to reflect the U.S. Census, allowing accurate society-wide estimates. 
We tested a mix of long-established police activities and cutting-edge 
technological investigative techniques. Finally, we replicated and improved on 
prior studies of third-person and hindsight biases. 
Together, our findings suggest that judicial speculation is a poor substitute 
for evidence. If the judiciary continues to craft doctrine about police invasions 
of privacy that is untethered to the actual expectations of the populace, it risks a 
crisis of legitimacy for both the police and the judiciary. 
APPENDIX A. EXPERIMENTAL MANIPULATIONS 
Respondents received the following instructions, with manipulations by 
experimental condition shown. 
Instructions: 1st Person/No Evidence of Crime. 
The purpose of this study is to examine people’s attitudes on various types 
of police actions. Below are 18 scenarios involving police actions. Assume in 
each case that the police are looking for evidence of criminal activity and that: 
(1) you have not engaged in criminal activity—that is, you are 
innocent of any criminal wrongdoing—and are not planning 
any crime; 
(2) you are presumed innocent of any criminal wrongdoing; and 
(3) you have not consented to the police action. 
Please rate each scenario in terms of “intrusiveness” that is, how 
intrusive you think each police action is, using a scale of 1 to 100. 
“1” means not intrusive at all, and “100” means extremely intrusive, 
while a “50” means moderately intrusive, and so on. 
Then please tell us whether you believe that the actions described 
in the scenario would violate your reasonable expectations of 
privacy. 
Instructions: 1st Person/Evidence of Crime: Substitute instruction 1 below. 
(1) the police found evidence of criminal activity by you, but 
Instructions: 3rd Person/No Evidence of Crime 
 
Tarver Robertson, Blind Expertise, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 174 (2010) (discussing partisan bias in expert 
testimony and solutions to the problem). 
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The purpose of this study is to examine people’s attitudes on various types 
of police actions. Below are 18 scenarios involving police actions. Assume in 
each case that the police are looking for evidence of criminal activity and that: 
(1) the target of the actions has not engaged in criminal activity—
that is, the person is innocent of any criminal wrongdoing—
and is not planning any crime; 
(2) the person is presumed innocent of any criminal wrongdoing; 
and 
(3) the person did not consent to the police action. 
Please rate each scenario in terms of “intrusiveness” that is, how 
intrusive you think each police action is, using a scale of 1 to 100. 
“1” means not intrusive at all, and “100” means extremely intrusive,  
while a “50” means moderately intrusive, and so on. 
Then, please tell us whether you believe that the actions described 
in the scenario would violate your reasonable expectations of 
privacy. 
Instructions: 3rd Person/Evidence of Crime: Substitute instruction 1 below. 
(1) the police found evidence of criminal activity by a person, but 
APPENDIX B. DEMOGRAPHICS AND REWEIGHTING 
Table B displays demographics and successful random assignment. The 
furthest right-hand column shows our targets for reweighting responses. The 
footnotes for this table indicate the source of the U.S. population demographics 
found in the right-hand column 
Table B. Demographics of Respondents by Experimental Condition and 
U.S. Population 
 
 284. U.S. Census Bureau QuickFacts: United States, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/US/PST045217 [https://perma.cc/4Z98-2TDB]. 
 285. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AGE AND SEX COMPOSITION: 2010 (2011), 
https://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-03.pdf [https://perma.cc/J5JQ-RALK]. 
 No Evidence Evidence of Crime U.S. Population 
 1st 
Person 
(n = 301) 
3rd 
Person 
(n = 300) 
1st 
Person 
(n = 301) 
3rd 
Person 
(n = 298) 
 
Sex284      
Female 59.5% 56.9% 62.5% 59.1% 50.8% 
Male 40.5% 43.1% 37.5% 40.9% 49.2% 
Age285      
18-34 47.2% 49.2% 49.5% 50.7% 30.6% 
35-49 32.9% 33.7% 30.6% 35.9% 27.2% 
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 286. See id. 
 287. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, THE HISPANIC POPULATION: 2010 (2011), 
https://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-04.pdf [https://perma.cc/2WWN-7U9L]. 
 288. See tables hyperlinked at Educational Attainment in the United States: 2010, U.S CENSUS 
BUREAU (Nov. 16, 2016), https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2010/demo/educational-attainment/cps-
detailed-tables.html [https://perma.cc/UL47-PPQS]. 
 289. CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT & BERNADETTE D. PROCTOR, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME 
AND POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES: 2014 (2015), 
https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2015/demo/p60-252.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6P66-E3WR]. 
50-64 17.6% 12.1% 16.6% 10.7% 25.1% 
Over 65 2.3% 5.1% 3.3% 2.7% 17.2% 
Ethnicity286      
White 63.8% 64.3% 67.8% 60.7% 72.4 % 
African American 17.9% 14.5% 16.6% 20.1% 12.6% 
Native American 3.3% 3.7% 2.0% 1.3% 0.9% 
Asian 7.6% 7.7% 8.0% 9.7% 4.8% 
Pacific Islander 0.3% 1.3% 0.3% 0.7% 0.2% 
Other 7% 8.4% 5.3% 7.4% 9.1% 
Hispanic287      
Non-Hispanic 79.4% 78.8% 79.1% 75.2% 83.7% 
Mexican origin 11.6% 11.1% 13.3% 14.8% 10.3% 
Puerto  
Rican origin 2.7% 3.4% 4.3% 3.4% 
 
1.5% 
Cuban origin 1.0% 1.7% 0.7% 1.0% 0.6% 
Other 5.3% 5.1% 2.7% 5.7% 4.2% 
Education288      
Some School 3.7% 1.7% 1.7% 3.0% 13.7% 
Graduated  
High School 17.9% 20.5% 20.9% 22.8% 
 
31.0% 
Some College 26.6% 25.6% 22.6% 27.2% 19.3% 
Associate’s 
Degree 14.0% 12.5% 12.6% 12.8% 
8.6% 
Bachelor’s 
Degree 25.2% 25.3% 32.2% 23.2% 
18.0% 
Master’s Degree 9.3% 10.1% 6.3% 6.4% 6.7% 
Professional 
Degree 2.3% 3.4% 1.3% 3.7% 
 
1.4% 
PhD 1.0% 1.0% 2.3% 1.0% 1.2% 
Income289      
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APPENDIX C. REGRESSION MODELS 
Table C1 shows the results of a regression analysis to find the odds ratio 
for variables of interest. The (Intercept) value corresponds to the odds of a 
violation in the reference case of a roadblock when all demographic and 
experimental variables are zero. Coefficients for values of categorical variables 
detailing the situation show the odds ratio if the situation in the case is changed 
to the given situation from the roadblock, but all else is unchanged. The ethnicity 
odds ratios are given relative to the category of “White.” The odds ratios for the 
binary variables show the results of changing the binary variable for Outcome 
from evidence of a crime to no crime, changing sex from Female to Male, 
changing from third person to first person, and changing each of the binary 
variables Hispanic, Searched, and Investigated Family from false to true. 
Coefficients for values of ordered variables show the odds ratio if the ordered 
variable is increased by one level, but all else is unchanged. The Pat-down 
Female coefficient is an interaction variable. The age effect is better fit by a 
quadratic, making the one year change uninformative. 
 
Table C1. Regression Model with Individual Scenarios and Covariates 
 
Variable p value Odds Ratio 
(Intercept) 0.0000 0.123 
Trunk 0.0000 11.817 
GPS 0.0000 40.698 
Bedroom 0.0000 19.758 
ID 0.0000 3.461 
Pat-down 0.0000 9.205 
 
 290. Party Affiliation, GALLUP NEWS, http://www.gallup.com/poll/15370/party-affiliation.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/79HK-TMLQ] (source at “2016 Jun 1–5”). 
 291. Matching both prefer and strongly prefer Democrats. 
 292. Matching both prefer and strongly prefer Republicans. 
 
Under $50,000 48.5% 44.8% 45.5% 47.7% 
 
46.8 % 
Over $50,000 51.5% 55.2% 54.5% 52.3% 53.2% 
Politics290      
Democrat 37.5% 34.7% 37.5% 40.6%     30%291 
Leans Democrat 18.6% 16.8% 12.6% 14.8% 18% 
Independent 20.3% 19.2% 22.3% 19.8% 1.0% 
Leans Republican 8% 12.8% 12% 8.7% 14.0% 
Republican 15.6% 16.5% 15.6% 16.1%     27.0%292 
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Track Phone 0.0000 19.389 
Infrared Photos 0.0000 9.093 
Web 0.0000 13.155 
Cloud 0.0000 38.784 
Email 0.0000 27.342 
E Retail 0.0000 11.429 
Dropped Phone 0.0000 17.560 
Gunshot 0.0122 1.319 
DNA 0.0000 4.336 
Stingray 0.0000 33.997 
Drone 0.0000 37.875 
Google Maps 0.0000 12.786 
Male 0.0008 1.474 
Pat-down Female 0.0004 1.729 
Age 0.6463 1.002 
Age Quadratic 0.0317 0.999 
African American 0.0016 1.639 
Ethnic–Other 0.0165 1.417 
Hispanic 0.2704 1.163 
Education 0.1854 0.946 
No Evidence of 
Crime 
0.5459 0.989 
Conservative 0.0001 0.886 
No Outcome 0.0000 2.439 
1st Person 0.0010 1.429 
Searched 0.1271 1.236 
Investigated Family 0.0058 1.497 
 
Table C.2. Regression Models to Isolate Significant Predictors 
 
Variable Race/Search Politics Age Income All Model 
No Evidence of Crime     2.28*** 
1st Person      .85** 
Gender     .88** 
Age    -.0022  .0051 
Age–Quadratic   -.0015*  -.0015* 
Education     -.14 
Income    -.062 -.033 
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Income–Quadratic    .027* .025* 
Hispanic     .21 
Conservative  -.34***   -.28*** 
Searched  1.65***    1.25** 
African American 2.21***    1.96*** 
American Indian  1.46    .49 
Asian .37    .47 
Pacific Islander 3.13    3.16 
Other Race 2.38***    2.05** 
Searched  
African American 
-2.71**    -2.67** 
Searched  
American Indian 
-.77    -.058 
Searched Asian .57    -.27 
Searched  
Pacific Islander 
-1.11    -.45 
Searched Race Other -1.74    -1.88 
Intercept 10.67*** 12.38*** 11.64*** 11.89*** 10.21*** 
Multiple R2 .04102 .01651 .0041 .005577 .1307 
Adjusted R2 0.03214 .01569 0.002469 .003915 .1152 
Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1 
The dependent variable reflects how many of the eighteen scenarios the 
subject found violated reasonable expectations of privacy. 
In the Race/Search regression model, we start with a white respondent who 
has not been the is 21.5-11.48(Income)+Income2. 
In the “all” model, we start with a non-Hispanic white female, where the 
question is framed in the third person with knowledge of the outcome (evidence 
of a crime). The person has not been the subject police investigation and the 
person’s family and close friends have not been the subject of a police 
investigation. Age is as above. Income is on a 0-12 scale, ranging from less than 
$10,000 to $200,000 or more. Education is on 2-8 scale, ranging from high 
school graduate to holder of a professional degree or doctorate. Political 
affiliation ranges from 0 = strongly prefer Democrats to 6 = strongly prefer 
Republicans. 
 
